Working Paper Series
Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law

Year 2005

One for All: The Problem of Uniformity
Cost in Intellectual Property Law
Michael W. Carroll
Villanova University School of Law, mcarroll@wcl.american.edu

This paper is posted at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository.
http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/wps/art41

CARROLL.OFFTOPRINTER

5/20/2006 1:46:49 PM

ONE FOR ALL: THE PROBLEM OF
UNIFORMITY COST IN INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW
*

MICHAEL W. CARROLL

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction.........................................................................................846
I. The Problem of Uniformity Cost..............................................849
A. Standard Economic Justification for Intellectual
Property Rights ...................................................................850
B. The Problem of Uniformity Cost.......................................852
1. The problem .................................................................853
2. Uniformity cost typology ..............................................856
3. Qualifying the problem ................................................857
II. Uniformity and Its Limits in U.S. Intellectual Property Law...861
A. The Constitutional Framework..........................................864
1. Subject matter ...............................................................865
2. Scope .............................................................................866
3. Duration ........................................................................867
B. Patent Law...........................................................................871
1. Subject matter ...............................................................871
2. Scope .............................................................................873
3. Duration ........................................................................874
C. Copyright Law.....................................................................875
1. Subject matter ...............................................................875
2. Scope .............................................................................876
3. Duration ........................................................................877
*
Associate Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law. I am grateful to
Dan Burk, Brett Frischmann, and Mark Lemley for helpful comments. In addition, I
thank the organizers and participants in the Law and Economics of Intellectual
Property Speaker Series at the University of Michigan Law School for their very
helpful reactions. Finally, for comments on this project at a much earlier stage, I
thank the participants in the Third Annual Intellectual Property Scholars’
Conference held at Boalt Hall and at the Penn-Wharton-Temple Colloquium.
William Freiberg and Edward Topolewski provided superb research assistance. All
errors remain mine.

845

CARROLL.OFFTOPRINTER

846

5/20/2006 1:46:49 PM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:845

D. Summary .............................................................................878
III. Options and Standards as Tools to Reduce Uniformity
Cost ............................................................................................878
A. Real Options .......................................................................879
1. Patent.............................................................................880
2. Copyright.......................................................................885
3. Scope options................................................................889
B. Standards in Intellectual Property Entitlements...............890
1. Patent.............................................................................892
a. Subject matter..........................................................893
b. Scope........................................................................896
2. Copyright.......................................................................897
a. Subject Matter .........................................................898
b. Scope........................................................................899
Conclusion ...........................................................................................900
INTRODUCTION
The law grants patents to inventors and copyrights to authors to
encourage investments in technological and cultural innovation.
While addressing an appropriability problem faced by innovators,
these intellectual property rights create a different problem by
supplying rightsholders with powerful weapons against end-users,
direct competitors, and follow-on innovators who seek to bring
socially beneficial innovations to market. To promote progress,
intellectual property law must strike a balance, providing sufficient
incentives for innovation without unduly stifling the efforts of followon innovators or the liberties of end-users.
In the law, balance usually calls for context sensitivity. However,
intellectual property law protects the owner of each patented
invention and each copyrighted work of authorship with a largely
1
uniform set of exclusive rights. Historically, this uniformity may have
been justified in light of the relative homogeneity of market
2
conditions applicable to protected subject matter. Technological
progress since the creation of intellectual property rights has led to
considerable growth in the range of inventions and expressive works

1. There are exceptions and qualifications to the claim that patent and
copyright owners, respectively, enjoy uniform rights. Nonetheless, as the discussion
in Part II demonstrates, the law does not differentiate the scope or duration of rights
granted on the basis of subject matter, level of investment, or any other metric. Infra
Part II. For purposes of this Article, discussion of “intellectual property” is shorthand
for patent and copyright law. Trademark, trade secret, rights of publicity and other
rights in information present related but different features that require separate
analysis beyond the scope of this Article.
2. See Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (1790) (current version 17
U.S.C. § 101 (2000)) (extending protection only to “maps, charts, and books”).
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3

to which patent and copyright law apply, respectively. In the modern
context, it is clear that innovators’ needs for intellectual property
protection vary substantially across industries and among types of
4
innovation. Applying a socially costly, uniform solution to problems
of differing magnitudes means that the law necessarily imposes
uniformity cost by underprotecting those who invest, or would invest,
in certain costly innovations and overprotecting those with low
5
innovation costs or access to alternative appropriability mechanisms.
Legal scholars recently have begun analyzing the problem of
uniformity cost in patent law. Professor Glynn Lunney, Jr. argues that
uniformity cost is the key to understanding the economic structure of
patent law and that recent doctrinal changes affecting the scope of
6
patents demonstrate this point. Further raising the prominence of
the problem, Professors Dan Burk and Mark Lemley argue that
uniformity cost is particularly high in relation to patent law’s

3. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology Specific?, 17
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155, 1159 (2002) [hereinafter Burk & Lemley, TechnologySpecific?] (“The ‘useful arts’ envisioned by the Framers were mechanical inventions
useful in a primarily agrarian economy.”). Historically, copyright law regulated the
publishing business. See also infra notes 127-137 and accompanying text (charting
expansion of copyrightable subject matter); see also Note, Exploitative Publishers,
Untrustworthy Systems, and the Dream of a Digital Revolution for Artists, 114 HARV. L. REV.
2438, 2438 (2001) (noting how digital technology has led to a “crisis in copyright”).
4. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L.
REV. 1575, 1581-83 (2003) [hereinafter Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers] (comparing the
pharmaceutical industry which requires a large research and development (“R&D”)
budget to the computer software industry which can operate on a much smaller
budget).
5. See, e.g., id. at 1584-85 (explaining that patent protection may not benefit
inventions which are impossible to imitate). Additionally, while market forces drive
patent protection, some inventors may pursue non-economic objectives such as
prestige, prizes, and job promotion. Id. at 1586. Furthermore, government subsidies
for innovation, for example, through the National Science Foundation and the
National Institutes of Health, offer an alternative to patent protection. Id. at 1586-87.
6. See generally Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Patent Law, the Federal Circuit, and the Supreme
Court: A Quiet Revolution, 11 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1 (2004) [hereinafter Lunney, Quiet
Revolution] (discussing uniformity costs in patent protection and arguing that
uniformity in patent protection undermines high cost innovation). Professor
Lunney’s colleague Professor Christopher Cotropia has further extended this line of
analysis. See Christopher A. Cotropia, “After-Arising” Technologies and Tailoring Patent
Scope, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 151, 152 (2005) [hereinafter Cotropia, “AfterArising”] (arguing that while after-arising equivalents protection is needed, it should
be “tailored to rapidly developing cumulative technology industries”); Christopher A.
Cotropia, Patent Claim Interpretation and Information Costs, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 57,
82-90 (2005) (discussing how minimizing informational costs in claim interpretation
promotes a clearer understanding of the boundaries of an invention’s patent
protection); Christopher A. Cotropia, “Arising Under” Jurisdiction and Uniformity in
Patent Law, 9 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 253, 286-302 (2003), reprinted in 36
INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 209, 243-59 (2004) (discussing how the U.S. Supreme Court’s
decision in Holmes allows for the development of non-uniform patent law).
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application to software and biotechnology, and that these costs can
7
be reduced by differential application of the Patent Act.
Building on this prior work, this Article generalizes the problem to
include copyright law and advances an analytical, a descriptive, and a
normative claim with respect to the problem of uniformity cost. First,
if one accepts the standard economic justification for intellectual
property rights, one must accept that exclusive rights must promise
some potential power over price to induce innovation. One must
also accept that different innovators require different kinds of
promises from the law.
From this premise follows the
underappreciated conclusion that perfectly tailored rights that
promise innovators only the expected value required to induce
8
socially desirable innovation would be theoretically optimal if
intellectual property rights were the only policy tool available to
promote innovation.
Intellectual property law falls short of this ideal for a host of
reasons including uncertainty about innovation, information
asymmetries between policymakers and innovators, administrative
costs of tailoring, and the political economy of intellectual property
policymaking. The law’s inability to achieve this ideal imposes
uniformity costs on society. While all laws impose some uniformity
cost because they are inevitably overinclusive or underinclusive in
some respects, uniformity cost matters from a pragmatic perspective
when initial entitlement allocations cannot readily be realigned to
accord with social commitments to allocative efficiency, distributive
justice, and personal autonomy. Part I explains why initial allocations
in patent and copyright law are not readily realigned and why,
therefore, the problem of uniformity cost in intellectual property law
is substantial.
Second, a descriptive account of contemporary patent and
copyright law in Part II demonstrates that the problem of uniformity
cost is embedded in the standard entitlements granted under each
body of law. However, the discussion in Part III demonstrates that
two features of these formally uniform rights can function, and do

7. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Biotechnology’s Uncertainty Principle, 54 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 691, 695-706 (2004) (discussing the stringent disclosure standards for
patents in the biotechnology industry); Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers, supra note 4, at
1689 (recommending that software patent policy should be reformed with respect to
the obviousness doctrine and disclosure requirements on the doctrine of
equivalents); Burk & Lemley, Technology-Specific?, supra note 3, at 1158-85 (discussing
heterogeneity in patent law).
8. See infra note 55 and accompanying text (qualifying this Article’s claim
concerning optimality in general and optimality of tailored rights in particular).
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function to some extent, to reduce uniformity cost: (1) real options
that regulate who acquires, and who keeps, intellectual property
9
rights; and (2) flexible standards that define rights to promote
10
context-sensitive application of the law.
Contemporary law also
includes provisions that have been legislatively tailored, and in a
separate paper, I analyze the tailoring of intellectual property rights
11
as a strategy for reducing uniformity cost.
Finally, this Article closes by claiming that the theoretical and
descriptive accounts lead to the conclusion that uniformity cost is the
central problem that intellectual property law must manage. There
are substantial pragmatic arguments that favor uniformity in the
current policymaking environment, but as uniformity cost rises with
the growing economic importance of, and variation among,
information-centric industries, policymakers should strive harder to
maximize context-sensitivity in intellectual property law. By making
uniformity cost the focus of economic analysis of intellectual property
law and by analyzing two important features of entitlement design
that can be deployed to reduce uniformity cost, this Article supplies a
general framework for analyzing the economic stakes in a range of
policy debates in contemporary intellectual property law.
I.

THE PROBLEM OF UNIFORMITY COST

Intellectual property rights impose social costs because they
12
interfere with competitive distribution of information goods. From
a dynamic perspective, some distortion must be tolerated as the price
13
for having the information created in the first place. The social
costs that matter, then, are not all static deadweight losses, but only
the distortions caused by rights that are more or less robust than
necessary to have induced investments in innovation that deliver a
9. See infra Part III.A (arguing that real options can promote social welfare in
some circumstances).
10. See infra Part III.B (discussing how flexibility can reduce uniformity costs by
customizing protection for different contexts).
11. Michael W. Carroll, Intellectual Property in the Twenty-First Century (unpublished
draft Apr. 2005) (on file with author).
12. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 74-76 (2003) (explaining that copyright protection is
needed to offset the costs of others copying inventions but adding that too much
protection causes market inefficiencies). The authors explain that the social
desirability of patent protection depends on the patentee’s fixed costs and how easy
it is for competitors to work around the patent, but that the patent system fails to
take these two factors into consideration, which in turn, leads to social costs. Id. at
297-310.
13. See id. (illustrating that a deadweight loss in the market for copies is caused
because greater copyright protection increases the price of a copy while decreasing
the number of copies sold).
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net benefit to society.
Uniform intellectual property rights
necessarily impose such costs. This Part demonstrates this point by
revisiting the standard economic justification for intellectual property
rights and then by reorienting this analysis around the problem of
uniformity cost.
This reorientation reveals that the theoretically optimal policy, if
intellectual property rights were the only feasible response to
underproduction of valuable information, would be to fashion
perfectly tailored rights rather than to promote perfect price
14
discrimination, as some theorists suggest. While perfect tailoring is
just as elusive as perfect price discrimination, the uniformity cost
perspective shows that the focus of policy analysis should be on how
intellectual property rights can be rendered more context sensitive.
Further, this theoretical reorientation emphasizes the role of “law” in
the law and economics of intellectual property because even after
economic analysis identifies industries or technologies for which
uniformity costs are particularly high, legal scholars must assess
whether legal institutions can competently address this problem.
A. Standard Economic Justification for Intellectual Property Rights
Intellectual property rights are a second-best solution to an
15
“appropriability problem.” The now familiar utilitarian justification
for intellectual property law starts with Thomas Jefferson’s
observation that information’s “peculiar character . . . is that no one
possesses the less, because every other possesses the whole of
it . . . . [H]e who lights his taper at mine, receives light without
16
darkening me.”
For Jefferson, the capacity for information to
“freely spread from one to another over the globe” is “benevolently
17
designed by nature.”
For the economist, however, given that
information is a public good, its “benevolent” design poses a
18
To the extent that pecuniary motivation drives
problem.
14. See id. at 39-40 (contending that perfect price discrimination is not feasible
given the difficulty in obtaining the required information about consumer
preferences).
15. See, e.g., Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA.
L. REV. 1, 12-14 (2005) (explaining that since intellectual property are public goods,
others would be able to copy inventions without first paying the related research and
development costs).
16. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in 3 THE
FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 42-43 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
17. Id.
18. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 108-09 (3d ed.
2000) (explaining that public goods can be consumed without depletion
(non-rivalrous consumption) and can be withheld from nonpaying beneficiaries only
at prohibitive cost (non-excludability)); see also Wilfried Ver Eecke, Public Goods: An
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innovation, we should not expect to see useful information
20
produced unless the producer can recoup his or her investment.
Producers, acting alone, cannot rely on competitive markets to supply
a sufficient return to make the investment in producing such
information worthwhile because the distribution of valuable
information cannot be controlled in the same ways scarce goods can,
21
given information’s non-rival nature. The government’s response
has been to grant and to administer rights under patent and
22
copyright law. Such rights give the innovator the power to exclude
or inhibit direct competition, which yields potential power over
23
price. If demand is sufficient, the innovator can use that power to
24
earn a positive return on investments in innovation.

Ideal Concept, 28 J. SOCIO-ECONOMICS 46 (1999) (identifying at least thirteen
economic problems related to public goods: “(1) decreasing costs in production,
(2) externalities, (3) joint supply, (4) nonexclusion, (5) nonrejectability, (6) benefit
spillovers,
(7)
unenforceability
of
compensation,
(8)
indivisibility,
(9) nonappropriability, . . . (10) nonrivalness, . . . (11) free
rider
possibility,
(12) multiple user good, [and] (13) lumpiness” (citations omitted). Information is
imperfectly excludable and its non-rivalrous quality makes it “problematic”).
19. The terms “valuable” and “useful” information in this Article refer to
information that is costly to produce and that members of our society find to be
useful, informative, enriching, or otherwise of value. Such information includes the
ideas and expressions or embodiments of those ideas found in, for example, novels,
movies, music, methods for manufacturing useful articles (medicines, computers,
clothing, etcetera), and computer software.
20. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property, 75
TEX. L. REV. 989, 994 (1997) [hereinafter Lemley, Economics of Improvement] (“In a
private market economy, individuals will not invest in invention or creation . . .
unless they can reasonably expect to make a profit from the endeavor.”); Christian
Koboldt, Intellectual Property and Optimal Copyright Protection, 19 J. CULTURAL ECON.
131, 134-35 (1995) (noting that copyright protection provides incentives for the
creation of inventions).
21. See, e.g., CARL SHAPIRO & HAL VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC
GUIDE TO THE NETWORK ECONOMY 3 (1999) [hereinafter SHAPRIO & VARIAN,
INFORMATION RULES] (explaining that “[i]nformation is costly to produce but cheap to
reproduce”); F.M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 622 (3d ed. 1990) (arguing that innovators must be given
some monopoly power in order to recoup high start-up costs); Mark A. Lemley,
Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1054-55 (2005)
[hereinafter Lemley, Free Riding] (contending that the competitive market for
information will result in an underproduction of inventions); Ian E. Novos &
Michael Waldman, The Effects of Increased Copyright Protection: An Analytic Approach, 92
J. POL. ECON. 236, 237 (1984) (illuminating the problem of free riding in the
software industry because of software’s nonrival nature).
22. See generally supra note 2 (discussing the history and evolution of intellectual
property law); The Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1332 (2000).
23. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 12, at 74-76 (explaining the effect of
copyright protection on the price and quantity of copies and on social welfare).
24. See, e.g., id., supra note 12, at 76-79 (demonstrating the effect of patent
protection on price and profit). While an increase in copyright protection increases
residual demand for the product, if the elasticity of residual demand sufficiently
declines, equilibrium output may decrease. Id. at 79.

CARROLL.OFFTOPRINTER

852

5/20/2006 1:46:49 PM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:845

While addressing underproduction, intellectual property rights
also impose social costs. Professor Lemley nicely summarizes these as
follows:
First, intellectual property rights distort markets away from the
competitive norm, and therefore create static inefficiencies in the
form of deadweight losses. Second, intellectual property rights
interfere with the ability of other creators to work, and therefore
create dynamic inefficiencies. Third, the prospect of intellectual
property rights encourages rent-seeking behavior that is socially
wasteful. Fourth, enforcement of intellectual property rights
imposes administrative costs. Finally, overinvestment in research
25
and development is itself distortionary.

B. The Problem of Uniformity Cost
Economic analysts generally agree that these social costs must be
minimized, and intellectual property rights should be no more robust
than necessary to induce the desired level of investment in cultural
26
and technological innovation. However, in both the economic and
the law and economics literature, the problem of social cost in
intellectual property law often is discussed at a very high level of
abstraction. The literature surrounding the optimal length of a
patent is a typical example.
Neoclassical economic models
concerning an optimal patent term often hold that optimality is
conditional, recognizing that efficiency might dictate varying terms
27
from patent to patent. Other analysts make the point more
25. Lemley, Free Riding, supra note 21, at 1058-59.
26. See, e.g., Lunney, Quiet Revolution, supra note 6, at 5 (arguing that patent
protection should be provided only to the “precise extent[] necessary to secure each
individual innovation’s ex ante expected profitability” and acknowledging that this
level will have to account for unsuccessful research efforts); William W. Fisher III,
Property and Contract on the Internet, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1203, 1249 (1998) (arguing
that the goal of copyright law is to “give creators enough entitlements to induce
them to produce the works from which we all benefit but no more”). The canonical
version of this argument was voiced by Lord Macaulay, who argued that a grant of
copyright was a grant of an evil monopoly and that “[f]or the sake of the good we
must submit to the evil; but the evil ought not to last a day longer than is necessary
for the purpose of securing the good.” Thomas Babington Macaulay, Speech in the
House of Commons (Feb. 5, 1841), in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF THOMAS BABINGTON
MACAULAY 241 (Sully & Kleinteich eds., Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1900).
Professor John Duffy argues that the mobility of capital makes analysis of the
causal connection between rights and investment levels unstable. John F. Duffy,
Intellectual Property Isolationism And The Average Cost Thesis, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1077, 107889 (2005). But see Mark A. Lemley, What’s Different About Intellectual Property?, 83 TEX.
L. REV. 1077, 1102-03 (2005) [hereinafter Lemley, What’s Different?] (responding that
because intellectual property rights distort the market away from competitive
equilibrium, entry will not necessarily compete away supracompetitive returns).
27. See infra notes 186-188 and accompanying text (discussing economic
literature on patent length).
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28

explicitly. But these economists offer no suggestion for how variable
patent terms might be implemented, and those who contemplate the
matter find the administrative difficulties intractable. This literature
29
points out the problem of uniformity cost in intellectual property law.
While economic analysis can help identify situations in which
uniformity cost is particularly high, it will require pragmatic legal
analysis to identify ways in which the legal system can competently
redress the problem.
1.

The problem
Legal scholars only recently have begun to analyze the social costs
of uniform rights as a general problem in intellectual property law.
Analyzing U.S. patent law, Professor Lunney has advanced a formal
economic model of uniformity cost that assesses the trade-offs
between strictly uniform rights, rights tailored to individual
30
innovations, and certain intermediate options. At bottom he shows
that “[e]ven where an innovative product represents the most
valuable use of available resources . . . an optimal uniform scheme of
protection will provide protection that will leave some desirable
31
innovative products unprofitable.”
To illustrate the point, imagine four innovations, A, B, C, and D.
These could be musical compositions, types of business software,
biotechnological inventions, or chemical compounds with
28. See infra notes 29-31 and accompanying text (discussing recognition of
uniformity cost in the literature).
29. See Lunney, Quiet Revolution, supra note 6, at 5-6 (stating that uniformity costs
rise as the gap between the optimal uniform level of protection and the level needed
for individual innovation increases). See generally Francesca Cornelli & Mark
Schankerman, Patent Renewals and R&D Incentives, 30 RAND J. OF ECON. 197, 197
(1999) (“A uniform patent life provides too much R&D incentive to low-productivity
firms and too little incentive to high-productivity ones.”).
30. See Lunney, Quiet Revolution, supra note 6, at 39-56 (illustrating that uniform
protection forces regulators to choose between encouraging innovation at the cost of
social welfare while an individualized protection scheme requires additional
administrative and information costs); see also Cornelli & Schankerman, supra note
29, at 197 (arguing that an optimum patent scheme can be achieved through various
patent renewal fees); Wendy A. Adams, Intellectual Property Infringement in Global
Networks: The Implication of Protection Ahead of the Curve, 10 INT’L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 71,
79-80 (2002) (noting that the ideal amount of patent protection requires a complex
analysis of a state’s economic and technological capacity).
31. See Lunney, Quiet Revolution, supra note 6, at 50-51 (arguing that excluding
otherwise desirable innovations would be advantageous when the benefits of doing
so are outweighed by the costs involved in excluding or extending protection to
preexisting innovations); see also Bruce Abramson, Promoting Innovation in the Software
Industry: A First Principles Approach to Intellectual Property Reform, 8 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH.
L. 75, 107 (illustrating that second-generation products may not reach the market if
the patent holder of a first-generation product refuses to cooperate with another
innovator who holds a block patent on the improvement to the first-generation
product).
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pharmacological uses. Society places a value of fifty on each of these
if it is available for use and is free from any intellectual property
rights. Assume that intellectual property rights apply uniformly to all
covered forms of information and can be calibrated to yield levels of
protection ranging from zero to three. Innovations B-D will require a
level of protection above zero to be created and distributed, so that A
alone will be created and distributed at zero, A and B will be created
and distributed at level one, and so on. As protection increases,
however, social value decreases because some users are priced out of
32
desired uses for which they would pay more than marginal cost.
Assume that each increase in the level of protection reduces the
social value of each innovation by ten. Sliding the protection lever
upward yields the following distribution of social values:
Level of
Protection
0
1
2
3

Innovations Created and
Distributed
A
A, B
A, B, C
A, B, C, D

Total Social
Value
50
80
90
80

A policymaker interested in maximizing social value from
intellectual property rights but bound by the uniformity condition
would set the level of protection at two, leaving innovation D
unprofitable even though society places a net positive value of twenty
on having it created. Within this highly stylized example, it is easy to
see that if the uniformity condition could be relaxed, it would be
possible to adjust rights to entice the creation of A-D by, for example,
eliminating protection for A and reducing the scope or duration of
rights granted to B.
Some empirical data suggest that the social costs of protecting
innovations such as A are not merely hypothetical. Edwin Mansfield
interviewed research and development managers from 100 randomly
selected firms to ask what percentage of each firm’s inventions would
have been developed and brought to market in the absence of patent
33
protection. Although any counterfactual query introduces certain
32. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 18, at 21 (explaining that marginal cost is the
cost associated with increasing an additional unit of output or production); id. at 300
(illustrating that social costs are the costs imposed on society due to private conduct,
such as having accidents).
33. See Edwin Mansfield, Patents and Innovation: An Empirical Study, 32 MGMT.
SCI. 173 (1986) (exploring how much innovation would decline without patent
protection and to what extent firms make use of the patent system). In 1994, Wesley
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biases and uncertainties, especially when posed to interested parties,
Mansfield’s data indicate that:
(1) a significant percentage of
inventions would have been developed and brought to market
without the prospect of patent protection; (2) this effect varies
significantly by industry; and (3) the availability of protection resulted
in eighty percent of patentable inventions being patented in
industries with high patent-dependencies (pharmaceuticals,
chemicals, petroleum, machinery, and fabricated metal products)
and sixty percent of inventions being patented in less patentdependent industries (primary metals, electrical equipment,
34
instruments, office equipment, motor vehicles, rubber, and textiles).
Similar results have been found in the semiconductor manufacturing
35
industry.
In fact, the problem of uniformity cost is potentially far more
significant than the example above suggests. The distribution of
rewards from both cultural and technological innovation is highly
36
skew. For example, uncertainty about demand or about feasibility
leads recording companies, motion picture studios, pharmaceutical
companies, and biotechnology research firms to invest millions of

Cohen randomly surveyed R&D lab managers on their methods of protecting patents
and received responses from 1,478 labs. Wesley M. Cohen et al., Protecting Their
Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or
Not) 1-4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7552, 2000)
[hereinafter Cohen et al., Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent], available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w7552. Of the firms surveyed, most viewed patents as
the least important in securing profits on an invention. Id. at 1; see also Richard C.
Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and Development, 1987
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 783, 793-99 (surveying R&D managers about
the efficacy of patents and finding that respondents rated patents as the least
effective method of appropriation and preferred other devices to protect returns on
investments).
34. Mansfield, supra note 33, at 175-76.
35. See Rosemarie Ham Ziedonis, Don’t Fence Me In: Fragmented Markets for
Technology and the Patent Acquisition Strategies of Firms, 50 MGMT. SCI. 804 (2004)
(explaining rise in defensive patenting in semiconductor industry); Bronwyn H. Hall
& Rosemarie Ham Ziedonis, The Patent Paradox Revisited: An Empirical Study of
Patenting in the U.S. Semiconductor Industry, 1979-1995, 32 RAND J. OF ECON. 101, 10405 (2001) (summarizing findings indicating that patents are ineffective as solutions
to appropriability in the industry and increases in patenting explained by other
factors).
36. See, e.g., F.M. Scherer, The Innovation Lottery, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 4-7
(Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss et al., eds. 2001) (collecting data showing that vast
majority of profit data was clustered in the range of low profit values but that the
distribution also had a long range of high values); F.M. Scherer, Dietmar Harrhoff &
Jörg Kukies, Uncertainty and the Size Distribution of Rewards from Innovation, 10 J.
EVOLUTIONARY ECON. 175, 175-79 (2000) (showing through an empirical study that
eighty-one to eighty-five percent of U.S. patents were in the top ten percent value
shares).

CARROLL.OFFTOPRINTER

856

5/20/2006 1:46:49 PM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:845
37

dollars that will never be recouped in innovation.
In these
industries, profits from chart-topping songs, blockbuster movies, and
blockbuster drugs must be sufficient to cover the losses incurred on
38
other investments. Consequently, industries such as these demand
robust intellectual property rights to maximize the profitability of
successful innovations. When these rights apply uniformly, the social
costs are magnified.
2.

Uniformity cost typology
Uniformity costs can be categorized as Type I or Type II. Type I
uniformity costs arise when the creators of the same class of subject
matter face different magnitudes or types of the appropriability
problem. For example, in the absence of copyright, some composers
would still create new music whereas others may pursue a different
line of work. The public would benefit if copyright applied to only
39
music created by the latter group. Instead, under U.S. copyright law
40
all music is protected by the same entitlement. Even when some
copyright incentives are needed, the magnitude of that need varies
based on the time, effort, and capital at risk or the incentives may be
needed to solve different kinds of problems. With respect to
software, for example, open source programmers rely on rights under
copyright to prohibit private appropriation of common-pool software
whereas many commercial software producers rely on copyright to
prohibit unauthorized public appropriation of privately held
41
software. Copyright law, however, treats all software as literary works
42
and supplies the same rights to both groups.
37. See, e.g., Edwin Mansfield et al., Social and Private Rates of Return from Industrial
Innovations, 91 Q. J. ECON. 221, 233-34 (1977) (stating that the median private rate of
return for the innovations studied was twenty-five percent).
38. See, e.g., Arthur S. DeVany & W. David Walls, Motion Picture Profit, the Stable
Paretian Hypothesis, and the Curse of the Superstar, 28 J. ECON. DYNAMICS & CONTROL
1035, 1039-40 (2004) (estimating from gross profit data over a thirteen year span that
only twenty-two percent of movies made were profitable and of those, thirty-five
percent made eighty percent of the total profits earned); Henry Grabowski, Patents
and New Product Development in the Pharmaceutical and Biotechnology Industries 14
(Working paper 2002), available at http://www.econ.duke.edu/Papers/Other/Grabo
wski/Patents.pdf (last visited Mar. 2, 2006) (finding that “the search for blockbuster
drugs is what drives the R&D process in pharmaceuticals” and that “[t]he median
new drug does not cover the R&D costs of the average compound”).
39. A more thorough welfare analysis would include, among other things, the
disaffection costs imposed on unprotected composers from being treated differently
than protected composers.
40. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2) (2000) (“musical works, including any
accompanying words”); id. § 102(a)(7) (“sound recordings”); id. § 106 (enumerating
types of available rights).
41. Compare David McGowan, Legal Implications of Open-Source Software, 2001 U.
ILL. L. REV. 241, 242 (2001) (describing that while the GNU/Linux operating system
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Type II uniformity costs also arise out of variable appropriability
problems. Even when all creators within an industry or technological
field face roughly the same type and magnitude of appropriability
problem, the magnitude and type of problem will certainly vary
43
among industries and technological fields. Nonetheless, patent law
grants the same entitlement to inventors of pharmaceutical drugs
and novelty toys, and copyright law grants roughly the same
entitlement to, for example, authors of novels and computer
programs. This uniformity highlights the imprecision of current
intellectual property law.
3.

Qualifying the problem
Granting uniform entitlements in patent and copyright law
necessarily will impose some Type I and Type II costs, and the
question for policymakers is how best to reduce these costs. The
magnitude of social costs incurred when the government rewards all
innovators with the same entitlement depends on the currency used.
If the government were to grant a uniform monetary entitlement to
all inventors—say a bounty of $1 million—whether their invention
were a life-saving biomedical device or a novelty toy, the social costs
of uniformity would be apparent and such a system would be grossly
inefficient.
Policymakers have chosen to grant legal rather than monetary
entitlements to innovators.
Uniform exclusive rights are not
immediately problematic because three market-based features of the
intellectual property system reduce uniformity cost:
demand
is copyrighted, the persons and firms who own the rights use them to further the
goals of the open source community, namely that the software “may be freely copied,
modified, and distributed, but only if the modifications (derivative works) are
distributed on these terms as well”), with Microsoft’s Software Piracy Protection
Home Page, http://www.microsoft.com/piracy (last visited Mar. 3, 2006) (providing
information on piracy including how to report it to Microsoft).
42. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (defining literary works as “works, other than
audiovisual works, expressed in words, numbers, or other verbal or numerical
symbols or indicia, regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as books,
periodicals, manuscripts, phonorecords, film, tapes, disks, or cards, in which they are
embodied”); see also Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 259 (5th Cir.
1988) (noting that Congress amended the Copyright Act in 1976 with the intention
of including software in the definition of literary works).
43. See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents, Product Exclusivity, and Information
Dissemination:
How Law Directs Biopharmaceutical Research and Development, 72
FORDHAM L. REV. 477, 486 (2003) (“Our patent laws are one-size-fits-all, applying
essentially the same rules to biopharmaceutical research that apply to automotive
engineering, information technology, semiconductors, and rocket science. But the
needs of these fields for patent protection differ.”); Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers,
supra note 4, at 1584 (“Appropriability is itself an amalgam of a complex set of
variables, many of which are themselves industry-specific.”).
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elasticity, price discrimination, and Coasean bargaining. The social
costs of intellectual property rights arise only when there is demand
for protected information. If demand for a novelty toy that would
have been invented in the absence of protection is zero, then even
though granting uniform patent rights was unnecessary, uniformity
44
cost is zero because no potential buyers have been excluded.
45
Uniformity costs rise with demand.
Even when these uniformity costs arise, under traditional economic
analysis, perfect price discrimination theoretically would eliminate the
underdistribution of protected information.
That is, static
deadweight loss would be zero if intellectual property owners were
able to fully engage in first-degree price discrimination, such as
selling or licensing to each user willing to pay more than marginal
46
cost. As others have shown, however, even as a matter of theory,
perfect price discrimination would not eliminate all social costs of
47
intellectual property rights.
Moreover, even if perfect price
discrimination would theoretically avoid reduction in social value,
perfect first-degree price discrimination in the intellectual property

44. See Patently Silly, http://www.patentlysilly.com (last visited Mar. 3, 2006)
(identifying such low-demand inventions). Of course, demand for the invention
does not refer to only demand in product markets. Any potential user of
information for which a patent owner might make a credible threat must be plotted
on the invention’s demand curve.
45. Increases in demand for a work also attract free riding competitors so that
increases in demand increase both the magnitude of the appropriability problem
and the magnitude of social cost. See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr. Reexamining Copyright’s
Incentives-Access Paradigm, 49 VAND. L. REV. 483, 557 (1996) (pointing out that
narrowing copyright protection necessarily reduces incentives to innovate along with
deadweight loss). Although we should expect rising demand to generate correlated
offsetting effects in many cases, when creators of popular works do not require the
power over price that patent or copyright promise, uniformity costs rise.
46. See SHAPIRO & VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES, supra note 21 at 39; Harold
Demsetz, The Private Production of Public Goods, 13 J. L. & ECON. 293, 303-04 (1970)
(positing that no single price in the market for privately produced public goods can
satisfy equilibrium requirements).
47. Economists have become less certain about the theoretical efficiency of
perfect price discrimination by natural monopolists or firms engaged in
monopolistic competition. See, e.g., V. Bhaskar & Ted To, Is Perfect Price Discrimination
Really Efficient? An Analysis Of Free Entry, 35 RAND J. OF ECON. 762, 775 (2004); Aaron
S. Edlin et al., Is Perfect Price Discrimination Really Efficient?: Welfare and Existence in
General Equilibrium, 66 ECONOMETRICA 897 (1998) (arguing that the efficiency of
price discrimination may be undermined by excessive entry of firms into the
market). Moreover, many attempts to modify intellectual property law to enhance
opportunities for price discrimination likely are undesirable. See generally Julie E.
Cohen, Copyright and the Perfect Curve, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1799 (2000); Michael J.
Meurer, Copyright Law and Price Discrimination, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 55 (2001)
[hereinafter Meurer, Price Discrimination]; Brett M. Frischmann, An Economic Theory
Of Infrastructure And Commons Management, 89 MINN. L. REV. 917, 978-80 (2005)
(discussing distortionary effects of promoting price discrimination).
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48

context is a practical impossibility. The real question is whether
policymakers should design intellectual property entitlements to
facilitate price discrimination so as to reduce uniformity cost. As
Michael Meurer has shown, some forms of price discrimination are
49
socially beneficial and others are socially harmful. Consequently,
even when the law can encourage price discrimination, the problem
of uniformity cost reemerges with respect to the need to tailor
entitlements to promote only beneficial price discrimination.
Finally, when demand is positive and price discrimination is
imperfect, the Coase Theorem asserts that uniformity cost will affect
allocative efficiency only if reallocation or reapportionment of
50
uniform entitlements by contract is too costly.
Commentators
disagree about the general magnitude of transaction costs in
intellectual property sales and licensing, but all would agree that the
51
costs are greater than zero. Indeed, most agree that difficulties in
valuing patents and copyrights raise transaction costs to the point
that allocative efficiency will depend upon the content of intellectual
52
property entitlements. This is particularly true because the
48. See, e.g., Lemley, Free Riding, supra note 21, at 1059 n.115; Christopher S. Yoo,
Copyright and Product Differentiation, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 212, 255 (2004) (noting that
entry of firms will eventually eliminate all supracompetitive profits); Daniel A.
Farber & Brett H. McDonnell, Why (and How) Fairness Matters at the IP/Antitrust
Interface, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1817, 1867 (2003) (adding that imperfect price
discrimination can have negative consequences).
49. See generally Meurer, Price Discrimination, supra note 47, at 90-94 (arguing that
in some circumstances, price discrimination is efficient because it makes producers
better off without making consumers worse off but in other circumstances, it is not
efficent because while producers are better off, total surplus is reduced); Michael J.
Meurer, Price Discrimination, Personal Use and Piracy: Copyright Protection of Digital
Works, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 845, 869, 894 (1997) (noting that price discrimination allows
sellers to generate more revenue but is more likely to induce buyers to band together
to share digital goods in order to arbitrage against differential pricing).
50. See Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 1, 16 (1960) (“In
these conditions [of high transaction costs] the initial delimitation of legal rights
does have an effect on the efficiency with which the economic system operates.”); see
also Cooter & Ulen, supra note 18, at 82-87 (explaining that the Coase theorem posits
that in the absence of transaction costs, all allocations are efficient because private
parties will bargain to internalize externalities). While arguing that policymakers
should recognize the effects they have on allocative efficiency when fashioning legal
rights for high transaction cost environments, Coase also recognized that
distributional justice matters and that “the choice between different social
arrangements for the solution of economic problems should be carried out in
broader terms than this [maximizing total output] and that the total effect of these
arrangements in all spheres of life should be taken into account.” Coase, supra note
50, at 43.
51. See Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 2655, 2661 (1994) [hereinafter Merges, Of Property Rules] (“Despite a
few brave attempts to assume away the obvious, those who have considered the
application of the Coase theorem to IPRs have noted the pervasive presence of
transaction costs.”).
52. See, e.g., Clarisa Long, Proprietary Rights and Why Initial Allocations Matter, 49
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externalities that justify patent and copyright law differ
53
fundamentally from those that inspired Coase, and the law’s choice
is not between granting an entitlement to party A or to party B but
between granting an entitlement to party A or to the public at large,
comprised of an unknown and often unknowable proportion of
54
higher and lower-valued users. Consequently, allocative inefficiency
in intellectual property law potentially imposes a far more significant
social cost than it does with respect to real property.
Thus, even after demand elasticity, price discrimination, and
Coasean bargaining have been accounted for, if the law grants
uniform intellectual property rights, society pays too much for
numerous innovations that would be created with less robust
55
protection, and the optimal level of protection must be set lower
than is necessary to induce the creation of certain costly but socially
56
desirable innovations.
The uniformity-cost perspective calls for a reorientation in the
economic analysis of intellectual property law. Those who argue that
perfect price discrimination alone would be a complete solution to
EMORY L.J. 823, 828-29 (2000) (arguing that uncertainty in valuation of patents on
basic research tools is likely to block efficient licensing of such tools); Nancy Gallini
& Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Propery: When is it the Best Incentive System?, in 2
INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 67 (Adam Jaffe et al. eds., 2001) (“The optimal
design of IP depends importantly on the ease with which rights holders can contract
around conflicts in rights.”); Lemley, Economics of Improvement, supra note 20, at 1053
(analyzing components of transaction costs and concluding that “[t]he result of all
these factors is that the transaction costs of intellectual property licenses are
significant”); James Bessen, Holdup and Licensing of Cumulative Innovations With Private
Information, 82 ECON. LTRS. 321, 326 (2004) (showing that “[t]he possibility of ex ante
licensing does not eliminate the problem of holdup in cumulative innovation”).
53. See, e.g., Merges, Of Property Rules, supra note 51, at 2657-64 (highlighting that
it is more difficult to identify the existence and severity of externalities in the context
of intellectual property than in physical property); Lemley, Free Riding, supra note 21,
at 1054-55; Lemley, What’s Different?, supra note 26, at 1098-1102 (noting that creating
intellectual property rights is more likely to have positive externalities and greater
costs than creating real property rights). See generally Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus
Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129 (2004) [hereinafter
Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post] (comparing traditional and new justifications for
intellectual property rights).
54. See generally Frischmann, supra note 47, at 939-80 (discussing a variety of
demand-side considerations for information resources).
55. In my view, interpersonal and intrapersonal incommensurability problems
make the notion of an optimal level of protection incoherent. Nonetheless, the case
for some level of protection is persuasive for at least some forms of information.
Those who share my doubts about the utility of optimality analysis should understand
“optimal level” to mean the level of protection that democratically-representative
policymakers would choose to bring about a desired amount of investment in
innovation, recognizing the incommensurable interests that are sacrificed with each
change in the level of protection.
56. See Lunney, Quiet Revolution, supra note 6, at 50-51 (arguing that this
conclusion helps explain why products such as business methods and clothing
designs are traditionally excluded from patent and trademark protection).
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the social costs of intellectual property rights err. In fact, if
intellectual property rights were the only available solution to the
underproduction problem, the ideal implementation would be
57
perfectly tailored rights —i.e. rights that promised the expected
value necessary to induce investment in only socially-desirable
innovations.
II. UNIFORMITY AND ITS LIMITS IN U.S. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
As is true in most areas of law, intellectual property entitlements
fall far short of the theoretically desirable design. This Part describes
the current state of patent and copyright law, showing that the
entitlements are largely uniform and that recent changes have
exacerbated the problem of uniformity cost. Before turning to the
specifics of U.S. intellectual property law, a few preliminary remarks
concerning the general design of intellectual property rights and the
difference between uniform and tailored rights are in order.
Intellectual property rights have three dimensions: subject matter,
scope, and duration. The subject matter of intellectual property
58
potentially is all information. Scope defines the actions that the
rightholder may engage in lawfully with respect to protected subject
matter, the actions of others for which the rightholder may seek legal
59
redress, and the remedial rules specifying available redress.
Duration is a relevant dimension because the U.S. Constitution
60
requires that federal patent and copyright rights be limited in time.

57. The claim for perfect tailoring is qualified because if policymakers had
sufficient information about expected value so as to perfectly tailor rights, a more
efficient policy response to underproduction would be to pay innovators directly for
the costs of innovation while leaving the costs of distribution to competitive markets.
See, e.g., Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post, supra note 53, at 135 (2004) (characterizing
intellectual property rights as a “necessary evil” and arguing that the default
preference in a market economy is to leave distribution to competitive markets).
Nonetheless, if the policymaker’s options are restricted to the creation of exclusive
rights, perfectly tailored rights are superior to a regime of uniform rights with
perfect price discrimination because dynamic inefficiencies would be eliminated as
well.
58. See, e.g., Thomas Cottier & Marion Panizzon, Legal Perspectives on Traditional
Knowledge: The Case for Intellectual Property Protection, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 371, 382-84
(2004) (asserting that information that intellectual property protects should be
interpreted broadly to include information that can create economic gain, such as
traditional knowledge).
59. See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry Into The Merits Of Copyright:
The
Challenges Of Consistency, Consent, And Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1343,
1356 (1989) (using Hohfeldian entitlement schema to describe scope of rights under
copyright).
60. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress power to secure exclusive
rights for authors and inventors for “limited Times”).
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Intellectual property rights are “uniform” when the subject matter
is broadly defined and the scope and duration of rights is the same
61
for all protected subject matter. Rights are “tailored” when scope or
duration varies depending either on the classification of the work or
invention along industry-specific or technology-specific lines, say, as
computer software, or classification of the initial rightholder (e.g.,
whether the rightholder was a government employee or used public
62
funds to create the protected information). Rights can be, and have
been, tailored along a continuum of abstraction.
In the most abstract sense, all intellectual property law has been
tailored because its subject matter does not include all information.
Even when the law makes some distinction between protected and
public domain information, that distinction could be captured by a
63
single set of intellectual property rights.
From this perspective,
differences in the rights granted by copyright and patent law,
respectively, represent a form of tailored protection driven by the
relative differences in functionality and expressiveness in patentable
64
and copyrightable subject matter. For purposes of this Article, the
baseline for measuring uniformity will be the now-traditional
copyright/patent distinction: Rights are “uniform” if the standard
rights under patent or copyright apply and are “tailored” if these
rights have been varied for particular subject matter or for particular
initial rightsholders.
Five sources of law specify the degree of uniformity for U.S.
intellectual property rights:
(1) the U.S. Constitution,

61. See Lunney, Quiet Revolution, supra note 6, at 6 (stating that if uniform rights
are given over information they must be narrowly tailored “to a particular instance
where the incentives available from a market . . . leave a significant gap between an
innovative product’s expected desirability, relative to alternative uses of the
resources, and its expected profitability”).
62. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 105 (2000) (“Copyright protection under this title is not
available for any work of the United States Government, but the United States
Government is not precluded from receiving and holding copyrights transferred to it
by assignment, bequest, or otherwise.”).
63. During the Renaissance, for example, the scope and duration of royal
privileges or letters patent granted to publishers and inventors were quite similar.
See, e.g., Michael W. Carroll, Whose Music Is It Anyway?: How We Came To View Musical
Expression As A Form Of Property, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 1405, 1407-08 (2004) (surveying
historical literature and giving examples in Western history of how music became the
subject of proprietary claims).
64. See, e.g., Dennis S. Karjala, Distinguishing Patent and Copyright Subject Matter, 35
CONN. L. REV. 439, 524 (2003) (arguing that digital technology creates pressure on
the information/function distinction between copyrightable and patentable subject
matter); see also Clarisa Long, Information Costs in Patent and Copyright, 90 VA. L. REV.
465, 466 (2004) [hereinafter Long, Information Costs] (arguing that patent and
copyright bundle distinct entitlements because of differing costs of conveying
information about the protected subject matter).
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(2) international obligations, (3) statutory entitlements, (4) judicial
opinions refining the contours of those entitlements, and
(5) administrative adjudicatory and regulatory interpretations of
those entitlements. The Constitution grants Congress the power to
65
enact patent and copyright laws, and Congress has provided some
66
form of patent and copyright protection since 1790. More recently,
the United States has committed itself to exercise that constitutional
authority subject to copyright-specific and patent-specific multilateral,
international agreements administered by the World Intellectual
67
Property Organization (“WIPO”). Overarching and reinforcing the
obligations under WIPO agreements are those the United States has
accepted as a party to the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
65. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
66. See Patent Act of 1790, Ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (Apr. 10, 1790) (current version at
35 U.S.C. §§ 100-05 (2000)) (detailing the process by which a patent or trademark
could be applied for and granted).
67. The copyright-specific agreements to which the United States is a party are:
the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9,
1886, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 211 (last revised at Paris, July 24, 1971)
[hereinafter Berne Convention], the Universal Copyright Convention, Sept. 6, 1952,
6 U.S.T. 2731, 216 U.N.T.S. 132, the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty,
Dec. 20, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-17, 36 I.L.M. 76 [hereinafter WPPT], and the
WIPO Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-17, 36 I.L.M. 65
[hereinafter WCT].
The United States also is party to narrower agreements offering tailored
protections with respect to specific forms of expression or modes of delivery. See, e.g.,
the Convention Relating to the Distribution of Programme-Carrying Signals
Transmitted by Satellite, May 21, 1974, art. 2(1), 13 I.L.M. 1444 (obligating member
states to regulate satellite transmission); The Convention for the Protection of
Producers of Phonograms Against Unauthorized Duplication of Their Phonograms,
Oct. 29, 1971, art. 2, 25 U.S.T. 309, 866 U.N.T.S. 67 (obligating member states to
protect phonogram producers against the making and importation of unauthorized
duplications).
The patent-specific agreements to which the United States is a party are: the Paris
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 21 U.S.T. 1583,
626 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris Convention]; the Patent Cooperation Treaty,
June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645, 1160 U.N.T.S. 231 [hereinafter PCT]; and the
Strasbourg Agreement Concerning the International Patent Classification, Mar. 24,
1971, 26 U.S.T. 1793. The United States also has signed but not ratified the Patent
Law Treaty, June 1, 2000, 39 I.L.M. 1047, which entered into force in Member States
on April 28, 2005. The United States also is party to agreements specifying tailored
procedural requirements. Budapest Treaty on the International Recognition of the
Deposit of Microorganisms for the Purposes of Patent Procedure, Apr. 28, 1977, 32
U.S.T. 1241, 1861 U.N.T.S. 361.
The International Court of Justice has jurisdiction to resolve disputes under the
principal substantive agreements, the Berne Convention (copyright) and the Paris
Convention (patent), but that jurisdiction has yet to be invoked. See GRAEME B.
DINWOODIE ET AL., INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY 45
(LexisNexis 2001); Graeme B. Dinwoodie, International Property Litigation: A Vehicle
For Resurgent Comparativist Thought?, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 429 (2001) [hereinafter “Int’l
IP Litigation”] (stating that the International Court of Justice has jurisdiction to
resolve disputes arising under both conventions, but no parties have invoked this
jurisdiction to date).
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68

Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”).
The current statutory
69
entitlements reside in the Patent Act of 1952, as amended, and the
70
The federal courts have
Copyright Act of 1976, as amended.
71
exclusive jurisdiction to enforce these entitlements, with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the United States
Supreme Court sharing exclusive appellate jurisdiction over well-pled
72
complaints arising under the Patent Act. Finally, the United States
Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) has administrative
responsibility for examining and issuing patents pursuant to the
73
Patent Act; whereas, the United States Copyright Office issues
copyright registrations, subject to minimal examination, and
74
performs other tasks delegated by the Copyright Act.
A. The Constitutional Framework
Patent and copyright law find constitutional legitimacy in the grant
of power “[t]o promote the progress of science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive

68. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. As a matter of
substantive law, the TRIPS Agreement primarily incorporates the essential
requirements of the Berne Convention for copyrights and the Paris Convention for
patents, as revised, but the enforcement mechanism under the TRIPS Agreement is
far more effective. The TRIPS Agreement is administered by the TRIPS Council of
the World Trade Organization. See Dinwoodie et al., supra note 67, at 45-47.
Disputes under the TRIPS Agreement are subject to the WTO’s dispute settlement
procedure and are subject to review by the WTO’s Appellate Body. Id.
These obligations apply only to how member States treat innovators or innovations
from other member States. Congress can depart from uniformity without violating
these obligations if such departures apply only to works created by United States
innovators. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 411 (applying a registration requirement in
copyright law only to U.S. works); see also infra notes 198-204 and accompanying text
(discussing this registration requirement).
69. See Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, 66 Stat. 792 (1952) (codified as
amended at 35 U.S.C. § 1, et seq. (2000)).
70. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-806 (2000).
71. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2000) (“The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents,
plant variety protection, copyrights and trademarks. Such jurisdiction shall be
exclusive of the courts of the states in patent, plant variety protection and copyright
cases.”).
72. See Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826,
832-33 (2002) (applying well-pleaded complaint rule to “arising under” jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1295(a)(1), 1338).
73. See United States Patent and Trademark Office, Manual of Patent Examining
Procedure, § 1309 (8th ed. 2001, 4th rev. 2005), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web
/offices/pac/mpep/documents/1300_1309.htm#sect1309 (detailing the process by
which electronic information submitted for the issuance of a patent is handled and
processed).
74. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 104(A)(e)(1)(A)(i) (describing the process by which a
notice can be filed with the Copyright Office to enforce a restored copyright).
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right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” For purposes of
this Article, the important question is whether Clause 8 requires or
prohibits uniform rights under patent or copyright. In general, the
Constitution grants policymakers wide discretion to address the
problem of uniformity cost in intellectual property law.
1.

Subject matter
The Court has inferred constitutional subject matter limitations
from Clause 8’s reference to “[a]uthors” and their “[w]ritings” and
“[i]nventors” and their “[d]iscoveries.” “[W]ritings” should be
76
understood broadly, but a creative work that has not been expressed
in any tangible form would fail to qualify as copyrightable subject
77
matter. In addition, from the terms “[a]uthors” and “[w]ritings,”
the Court has inferred that copyright requires a modicum of
creativity and may not extend to unoriginal writings, such as factual
78
compilations organized in an obvious manner.
With respect to patent law, the Court has asserted, as a matter of
statutory interpretation, that laws of nature, natural phenomenon,
79
and abstract ideas are unpatentable.
Whether there is a
75. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. This Constitutional provision lacks a consensus
designation among courts or commentators. For some, it is the “Copyright and
Patent Clause.” Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 192 (2003). For others it is the
“Patent and Copyright Clause.” Id. at 214 n.20. Others prefer the more textual
“Exclusive Rights Clause.” Lawrence Lessig, Copyright’s First Amendment, 48 UCLA
L. Rev. 1057, 1068 (2001). Many others refer to it as the “Intellectual Property”
Clause. See, e.g., Paul J. Heald & Suzanna Sherry, Implied Limits on the Legislative Power:
The Intellectual Property Clause as an Absolute Constraint on Congress, 2000 U. Ill. L. Rev.
1119. In the interests of scholarly and judicial consensus, it shall be referred to
hereinafter, however inelegantly, as “Clause 8,” since we can all agree that the
provision is the eighth clause in Article I. See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546,
562 (1972) (using “Clause 8”).
76. See Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 561 (holding that the term writing includes, “any
physical rendering of the fruits of creative intellectual or aesthetic labor”); BurrowGiles Lithographic v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884) (stating that Clause 8 “Writings”
include “all forms of writing, printing, engraving, etching, by which the ideas in the
mind of the author are given visible expression”). Potentially, the term “writing”
imposes a “minimum size” principle on fixed expression eligible for copyright. Cf.
Justin Hughes, Size Matters (or Should) in Copyright Law, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. (2005)
(proposing minimum size principle to explain absence of copyright protection for
“microworks”).
77. See United States v. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413, 423-24 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)
(stating that unfixed works are not constitutional “writings”); KISS Catalog v.
Passport Int’l Prods., Inc., 350 F. Supp. 2d 823, 831 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (“If ‘writings’
continues to exist as a constitutional limit, live performances cannot be within the
scope of that term.”).
78. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361-63 (1991)
(holding that a telephone directory’s information organized without any original
characteristics does not meet the Constitutional requirements of copyright).
79. See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981) (“A principle, in the
abstract, is a fundamental truth; an original cause; a motive; these cannot be
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constitutional foundation for this assertion may be tested in future
80
cases. At least one commentator has suggested a more restrictive
reading of Clause 8, asserting that “useful [a]rts” is the relevant
subject matter limitation and that it limits the discoveries that patent
law can protect to those related to technology, in contradistinction to
81
innovations in the traditional liberal and fine arts. The Court does
not seem to be receptive to such arguments, however.
2.

Scope
The Constitution empowers Congress to “secure” the “exclusive
82
right” to a writing or discovery. To date, the courts have not had
reason to define the limits of Congress’s power to define the scope of
an author’s or inventor’s exclusive right, although one Justice has
83
asserted that the text of the Constitution does impose such a limit.
Presumably the text imposes some nexus requirement between the
right granted and the writing or discovery to which the right relates,
but the courts have not specified how close this nexus must be. With
respect to uniformity, the text might support an argument that the
grant of power to secure “the” exclusive right requires that if
Congress enacts patent or copyright legislation, it must extend the
same right to all inventors or authors, respectively; however, little in
the history or structure of Clause 8 supports this reading.

patented, as no one can claim in either of them an exclusive right.” (quoting Le Roy
v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156, 175 (1852))).
80. See, e.g., Saul Levmore, Property’s Uneasy Path and Expanding Future, 70 U. CHI.
L. REV. 181, 193 (2003) (“[W]e should expect sporadic agitation for a property right
in a (mere) idea—because the winners are identifiable and the exploitation of the
idea will often not identifiably impede on an existing set of easily organized holders
of property rights.”); see also Arthur R. Miller, Common Law Protection for Products of the
Mind: An “Idea” Whose Time Has Come, 119 HARV. L. REV. 703 (2006) (proposing such
expansion).
81. See John R. Thomas, The Patenting of the Liberal Professions, 40 B.C. L. REV.
1139, 1164 (1999) (arguing that the few materials available suggest that the Framers
did not intend to have every created thing be covered by Clause 8).
82. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, cl. 8.
83. See United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 320 (1948) (Douglas, J.,
concurring):
Congress has much to say as to the pattern of our economic organization.
But I am not clear that Congress could expand “the exclusive right” specified
in the Constitution into a right of inventors to utilize through a price-fixing
combination the production and marketing facilities of competitors to
protect their own high costs of production and eliminate or suppress
competition. It is not apparent that any such restriction or condition
promotes the progress of science and the useful arts.
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3.

Duration
84
Patents or copyrights may be “secured” only for “limited Times.”
At a minimum, this means that Congress may not make the term of
85
patent or copyright protection perpetual, the wishes of some
86
legislators notwithstanding. The Court’s current interpretation of
the constitutional limit is that Congress does not violate the “limited
Times” constraint by retrospectively extending the terms of subsisting
copyrights and patents so long as the extended term has a defined
87
end. Additionally, the Court has suggested that Congress may not
extend protection to protected subject matter for which the limited
88
time of protection has expired, although lower courts recently have
89
rejected that understanding.
In addition to these explicit subject matter, scope, and duration
limits, Clause 8 declares that the purpose of the grant of power is “to
90
promote the progress of Science and useful Arts.” If this “preamble”
imposes a progress limitation on Congress’s power, it could serve as
the basis for attacking or promoting uniformity in some
91
circumstances. Although Congress undoubtedly would have wide
84. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, cl. 8.
85. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 209 n.16 (2003) (“[T]he
Constitution ‘clearly precludes Congress from granting unlimited protection for
copyrighted works.’”) (quoting with approval S. REP. NO. 104-315, at 11 (1996));
United States v. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413, 424 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“It is clear that
the ‘Limited Times’ restriction in the Copyright Clause prohibits Congress from
granting Copyright protection of perpetual duration.”); KISS Catalog v. Passport Int’l
Prods., Inc., 350 F. Supp. 2d 823, 833 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (holding that perpetual term
violated “limited Times” requirement).
86. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 256 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“After all, the statute was
named after a Member of Congress, who, the legislative history records, ‘wanted the
term of copyright protection to last forever.’”) (citation omitted).
87. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 199 (interpreting “limited” to mean “confined within
certain bounds,” “restrained,” or “circumscribed” and holding that “a timespan
appropriately ‘limited’ as applied to future copyrights does not automatically cease to
be ‘limited’ when applied to existing copyrights”).
88. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989)
(“Congress may not authorize the issuance of patents whose effects are to remove
existent knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free access to materials
already available.” (quoting Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 6
(1966))); Eldred, 537 U.S. at 234 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the extension
of patent protection to items where the patent had expired is unconstitutional).
89. See Luck’s Music, Inc. v. Gonzales, 407 F.3d 1262, 1266 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
(distinguishing Graham); Golan v. Gonzales, No. Civ.01-B-1854(BNB), 2005 WL
914754, at *3-4 (D. Colo. Apr. 20, 2005) (appeal filed) (claiming that it is doubtful
that the basis for the Graham decision could govern copyright cases).
90. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
91. Whether the current Court reads the preamble to be hortatory or mandatory
is subject to doubt. Compare Graham, 383 U.S. at 5-6 (1966) (treating the preamble as
a substantive limit on Congress=s power), with Eldred, 537 U.S. at 196 (relying on
petitioners’ concession below that circuit precedent precluded argument that
progress was a substantive limit while also implicitly treating the progress clause as a
limitation on congressional action subject to rational basis review). See also Figueroa
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discretion to define progress and to determine whether a particular
92
legislative measure promotes it, at the margins, the progress
limitation could support an argument that application of uniform
rights to particular subject matter or in a particular case would so
clearly impede progress that the rights must be tailored to be
constitutional. For example, during the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, lower courts held that the “progress” limitation
required that copyright law be tailored to exclude protection for
93
immoral subject matter.
Legislative or judicial departures from uniformity could implicate
94
three other constitutional provisions: the First Amendment, the
95
96
and the Takings Clause.
The First
Commerce Clause,
Amendment’s broad prohibition on content and viewpoint
discrimination in expression is more likely to constrain Congress’s
97
ability to differentiate rights under copyright than patent. While the
Court has expressly acknowledged that the First Amendment imposes
v. United States, 66 Fed. Cl. 139, 152 (Fed. Cl. 2005) (accepting the progress
limitation on Congress’s power and holding that diversion of fees from PTO to be
necessary and proper to promotion of progress).
92. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 213 (“The justifications we earlier set out for Congress’s
enactment of the CTEA . . . provide a rational basis for the conclusion that the CTEA
‘promote[s] the Progress of Science.’”) (internal citation omitted).
93. See Simonton v. Gordon, 12 F.2d 116, 124 (D.C.N.Y. 1925) (holding that
public policy required denying copyright protection for Ablasphemous, seditious,
immoral or libelous@ subject matter but that the work at issue was not immoral); see
also Broder v Zeno Mauvais Music Co., 88 F. 74, 77-79 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1898) (holding
that song “Dora Dean” with lyrics describing woman as “the hottest thing you’ve ever
seen” not entitled to copyright protection because use of “hot” in this context
rendered lyrics immoral); Martinetti v Maguire, 16 F. Cas. 920, 922 (C.C. Cal. 1867)
(No. 9173) (concluding that, consistent with the progress limitation, Congress had
tailored protection to exclude immoral subject matter by defining protected musical
compositions as those “suited for public representation”).
94. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
95. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress the ability to “regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes”).
96. U.S. CONST. amend. V (forbidding private property to be taken for public
use, without just compensation).
97. With respect to patent law, one could imagine the First Amendment
furnishing the basis for a successful challenge to a rejection on the grounds of
“moral utility” assuming that the applicant could find a nexus to protected
expression either with respect to the invention itself or, perhaps, an expressive
interest in having the government recognize the inventor qua inventor. In addition,
software patents are an area in which the First Amendment may play a role. See
generally Dan L. Burk, Patenting Speech, 79 TEX. L. REV. 99, 162 (2000) (arguing that
First Amendment protections of expressive elements in software patents will pose
challenge for patent law and concluding that “[i]n patent law, perhaps new doctrines
can be tailored specifically to the problem of patenting speech”). Patent law may
also have to confront other claims of expressive harm as well. See generally Timothy R.
Holbrook, Curing Heterosexuality? Moral Signals and the Potential for Expressive Impacts in
Patent Law (working paper), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abs
tract_id=702587#PaperDownload.
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limits on Congress’s power to grant rights under copyright, those
limits remain largely undefined because, in the current Court’s view,
doctrines internal to copyright law supply sufficient limits for the
98
time being.
The First Amendment could require tailoring of
copyright’s exclusive rights to permit unauthorized uses in certain
99
cases or classes of case. Alternatively, the First Amendment also
100
could be used to require uniformity.
The Commerce Clause and Takings Clause deserve mention but do
not warrant extended discussion for present purposes. Whether the
Commerce Clause offers Congress an alternative basis to pass
legislation that would violate the constraints imposed by Clause 8,
such as protection of unoriginal databases, is a question the Court
101
has touched on,
and is one over which lower courts and
102
commentators have engaged in vigorous debate. If the Commerce
98. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003) (“We recognize that the
D.C. Circuit spoke too broadly when it declared copyrights ‘categorically immune
from challenges under the First Amendment.’ But when, as in this case, Congress
has not altered the traditional contours of copyright protection, further First
Amendment scrutiny is unnecessary.”). Nonetheless, the power to enjoin speech
through a copyright injunction remains potentially problematic. See SunTrust Bank
v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 252 F.3d 1165, 1166 (11th Cir. 2001) (dissolving copyright
infringement injunction on First Amendment grounds), vacated and superseded by 268
F.3d 1257, 1259 (11th Cir. 2001); Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom Of
Speech And Injunctions In Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147 (1998) (arguing
that infringement injunctions should be subjected to constitutional scrutiny).
99. See, e.g., MELVILLE, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.10[A] (1981) (suggesting
potential First Amendment defense to copyright infringement) as expanded in 1
MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.10(D) (2002)
(extending potential First Amendment defense to instances in which “vital news
elements will be lost unless the exact language can be quoted”).
100. Consider, for example, whether Congress constitutionally could withdraw
copyright protection from pornographic expression on the theory that the exclusive
rights serve as an undesirable public subsidy for this form of expression. See
Martinetti v. Maguire, 16 F. Cas. 920, 922 (C.C. Cal 1867) (No. 9173) (interpreting
grant of copyright protection as form of public subsidy). In recent decades, the
lower courts have rejected the contention that an obscenity exception should be read
into current copyright law and have suggested that any attempt to so tailor rights
under copyright may violate the First Amendment. See generally Mitchell Bros. Film
Group v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852, 858 (5th Cir. 1979) (“We can only
conclude that we must read the facially all-inclusive 1909 copyright statute as
containing no explicit or implicit bar to the copyrighting of obscene materials, and
as therefore providing for the copyright of all creative works, obscene or nonobscene, that otherwise meet the requirements of the Copyright Act.”); Pillsbury Co.
v. Milky Way Prods., 1981 WL 1402 *9 n.10 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 24, 1981) (holding no
implied obscenity exception to fair use defense).
101. See, e.g., Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 34
(2003) (suggesting that Congress could not rely on Commerce Clause to impose
attribution requirement on public domain information).
102. See United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1274-77 (11th Cir. 1999)
(suggesting Congress may protect unfixed sound recordings under Commerce
Clause). But see United States v. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413, 425 (S.D.N.Y 2004)
(appeal filed) (“Congress may not, if the Copyright Clause does not allow for such
legislation, enact the law under a separate grant of power, even when that separate
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Clause is available, then the wide discretion granted Congress to
regulate interstate commerce would further extend the already broad
103
range of tailoring options available under Clause 8. Conversely, the
Takings Clause potentially raises the price of tailored intellectual
property legislation.
If the federal government, through the
legislative or executive branch, violates rights under copyright or
patent, it has consented to be sued for damages in the U.S. Court of
104
Federal Claims.
Similarly, it seems likely that if the government
were to condemn for public use an individual patent or copyright,
105
just compensation would be due under the Takings Clause.
A far

grant provides proper authority.”); KISS Catalog v. Passport Int’l Prods. Inc., 350 F.
Supp. 2d 823, 833 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (citing Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 425).
Among commentators, compare Thomas B. Nachbar, Intellectual Property and
Constitutional Norms, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 272 (2004) (arguing that Congress may rely
on other Article I enumerated powers to evade constraints imposed by Clause 8),
with Yochai Benkler, Constitutional Bounds of Database Protection: The Role of Judicial
Review in the Creation and Definition of Private Rights in Information, 15 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 535, 538-39 (2000) (asserting that the Intellectual Property Clause serves as a
limit to the extent where Congress can secure exclusive rights in information), Paul
J. Heald & Suzanna Sherry, Implied Limits on the Legislative Power: The Intellectual
Property Clause as an Absolute Constraint on Congress, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 1119, 1177 &
n.409, Robert Patrick Merges & Glenn Harlan Reynolds, The Proper Scope of the
Copyright and Patent Power, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 45, 63-64 (arguing that if Congress
could pass legislation under the Commerce Clause that it could not under Clause 8,
it would effectively read Clause 8 out of the Constitution), and William Patry, The
Enumerated Powers Doctrine and Intellectual Property: An Imminent Constitutional Collision,
67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 359, 361 (1999) (claiming that Congress cannot make an end
run around the Constitutional restriction of Clause 8 by passing legislation under
another power).
103. See supra Part II (discussing in depth the tailoring of intellectual property
rights).
104. 28 U.S.C. § 1498.
With respect to infringement by states, some
commentators argue that the Takings Clause should supply a remedy. See, e.g.,
Mitchell N. Berman et al., State Accountability for Violations of Intellectual Property Rights:
How to “Fix” Florida Prepaid (And How Not To), 79 TEX. L. REV. 1037, 1072 (2001)
(stating that state infringements of patents, copyrights, and trademarks are likely
compensable takings); Shubha Ghosh, Toward a Theory of Regulatory Takings for
Intellectual Property: The Path Left Open After College Savings v. Florida Prepaid, 37 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 637 (2000) (arguing that state infringement of intellectual property
might be remedied by takings suits); Paul J. Heald & Michael L. Wells, Remedies for the
Misappropriation of Intellectual Property by State and Municipal Governments Before and
After Seminole Tribe: The Eleventh Amendment and Other Immunity Doctrines, 55 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 849, 870-72 (1998) (stating that the intention of the Takings Clause is to
limit the government’s ability to force an individual to release their interest in
property and that this intention is implicated when the government uses intangible
property it does not own).
105. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2181(a) (2000) (revoking patent grant for any invention
useful in connection with atomic weapons and ordering that just compensation be
paid to patent owners); cf. Ruckleshaus v. Monsanto Co., 463 U.S. 1315, 1317 (1983)
(holding that government-mandated disclosure of trade secrets are compensable
takings).
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more contestable issue is whether legislative change to patent or
106
copyright law could ever amount to a regulatory taking.
In sum, the Constitution imposes few constraints on policymakers’
discretion to address the problem of uniformity cost in intellectual
property law. The text of the Constitution could support arguments
requiring tailoring of intellectual property rights in specific
circumstances and prohibiting it in others. The cases likely to
generate such arguments will be rare, and as a general matter, courts
are likely to be unreceptive to constitutional arguments concerning
tailored rights under patent or copyright. Consequently, Congress
and the courts retain wide discretion in this field.
B. Patent Law
In patent law, Congress has used its discretion to grant largely
uniform rights. Some features of the law are designed to reduce the
social costs of this uniformity, but the problem of uniformity cost has
been exacerbated by recent international commitments that limit
policymakers’ flexibility. TRIPS and the Paris Convention generally
establish a set of uniform patent rights that member states must
grant, but both agreements either tailor the minimum requirements
for some subject matter or, more often, grant member states
discretion to tailor patent rights. The Patent Act grants largely
uniform rights, although Congress has exercised its tailoring
discretion in some important instances.
1.

Subject matter
TRIPS demands that Member States extend patent rights to “any
inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of technology,
provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are capable
107
of industrial application.” Largely tracking this requirement, the
Patent Act grants utility patent protection for any novel, non-obvious,
and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
108
matter.
An invention is “useful” if the invention performs as the
inventor specifies and if the utility of that performance is specific,
106. See, e.g., J. Nicholas Bunch, Note, Takings, Judicial Takings, and Patent Law, 83
TEX. L. REV. 1747, 1790-93 (2005) (applying a regulatory takings analysis to patent
law).
107. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 68, art. 27(1). For an argument that U.S.
patent law is in tension with these uniformity constraints by tailoring on technologyspecific lines, see Burk & Lemley, Technology-Specific, supra note 3, at 1183-85
(describing the different treatment U.S. law gives to different industries). Separately,
the inventor has the right to be identified as such in an issued patent. Paris
Convention, supra note 67, art. 4.
108. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103 (2000).
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109

substantial, and credible. An invention is novel if it is not “known
or used in this country, or patented or described in a printed
110
publication in this or a foreign country.”
Non-obviousness is the subject matter doctrine that does the most
work in striking the incentives/access balance in patent law. An
invention is unpatentable “if the differences between the subject
matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the
subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the
invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art
111
(“PHOSITA”) to which said subject matter pertains.”
When
assessing non-obviousness, courts must consider context-specific
information: (1) the scope and content of the prior art, (2) the
differences between the prior art and the claimed invention, (3) the
level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art, (4) secondary
considerations such as commercial success and long-felt need in the
112
art.
Commentators generally agree that the Federal Circuit
elevated the stature of these “secondary” considerations, rendering
113
them central to non-obviousness (Section 103) analysis.
109. See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534-35 (1966) (stating that an invention
is useful if a “specific benefit exists in a currently available form”). But see In re Brana,
51 F.3d 1560, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“Usefulness in patent law, and in particular in
the context of pharmaceutical inventions, necessarily includes the expectation of
further research and development.”).
The PTO has refined the Brenner
understanding of utility by requiring the applicant to show “well-established utility”
for the invention, meaning that “a person of ordinary skill in the art would
immediately appreciate why the invention itself is useful” and that such utility is
“specific, substantial, and credible.” U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Utility
Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1098 (Jan. 5, 2001); see also Jonathan
Kahn, What’s The Use? Law and Authority in Patenting Human Genetic Material, 14 STAN.
L. & POL’Y REV. 417, 435-36 (2003) (discussing competing models of utility in
comments to PTO). The Federal Circuit has recently endorsed the PTO’s reading of
Brenner. See In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1372, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225, 1230 (Fed.
Cir. 2005) (“The PTO’s standards for assessing whether a claimed invention has a
specific and substantial utility comport with this court’s interpretation of the utility
requirement of § 101.”).
110. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000). See Linda J. Demaine & Aaron Xavier Fellmeth,
Reinventing The Double Helix:
A Novel and Nonobvious Reconceptualization of the
Biotechnology Patent, 55 STAN. L. REV. 303, 386-88 (2002) (arguing that the Patent Act
imposes two distinct requirements: “newness” under Section 101 and “novelty”
under Section 102).
111. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000).
112. See Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966)
(describing the test for obviousness under § 103 of the United States Code).
113. See, e.g., Robert L. Baechtold, How To Sell Nonobviousness and Obviousness, 258
PRACTICING LAW INST. 511, 527-40 (1988) (“The other great contribution the Federal
Circuit made to the patentee’s cause was to elevate the considerations of commercial
success, long felt need, failure of others and copying to major players in the
determination of obviousness.”); Lunney, Quiet Revolution, supra note 6, at 23-24
(arguing that the Federal Circuit’s treatment of the secondary considerations has
made it less likely that a patent is obvious); see also Robotic Vision Sys., Inc. v. View
Eng’g, Inc., 189 F.3d 1370, 1376, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d 1948, 1952 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding
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2.

Scope
The scope of patent rights is defined uniformly for most types of
invention. TRIPS requires that the owner of a product patent have
the exclusive right to prevent third parties, without the owner’s
consent, from: making, using, offering for sale, selling, or importing
114
for these purposes that product. The owner of a process patent is
to have the exclusive right to prevent third parties, without the
owner’s consent, from the act of using the process, and from the acts
of: using, offering for sale, selling, or importing for these purposes
115
at least the product obtained directly by that process. In the United
States, the scope of patent law has been quite uniform from
116
inception.
A utility patent gives its owner the rights to exclude
others from: making, using, offering to sell, selling, or importing the
117
invention in the United States during the term of protection. A few
statutory exceptions permit certain classes of users to use certain
118
types of invention without liability, but otherwise patentees all enjoy
the same rights of exclusion.
The patent entitlement is protected by both a property and a
119
liability rule. Patent owners are eligible to receive preliminary and
that a patent was not obvious under the § 103 considerations); Modine Mfg. Co. v.
Allen Group, Inc., 917 F.2d 538, 541, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1622, 1624 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
(holding that the evidence sustained a finding of nonobviousness); Loctite Corp. v.
Ultraseal, Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 872-73, 228 U.S.P.Q. 90, 98 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (finding
reversible error where secondary considerations are ignored in a determination of
obviousness); Oscar Mayer Foods Corp. v. Con-Agra, Inc., 45 F.3d 443, 448, 35
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1278, 1278-79 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (accepting the District Court’s
findings that the patent was infringed).
114. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 68, art. 28(1)(a).
115. Id. at art. 28(1)(b).
116. Compare Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109 (granting inventor “the sole
and exclusive right and liberty of making, constructing, using and vending to others
to be used, the said invention or discovery”), with 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000)
(establishing that anyone who makes, uses, offers to sell, sells, or imports any
patented invention in the United States during the patent term infringes the patent,
unless an exception applies).
117. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000). The exclusive right to offer to sell the invention
was added in response to the TRIPS Agreement. See Uruguay Round Agreements
Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 533(a), 108 Stat. 4809, 4988 (1994) (adding offer-to-sell
language to 35 U.S.C. § 271(a), (c), (e), and (g)).
118. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (permitting the making, using, and selling of patented
inventions, other than new animal or veterinary products, which are primarily
manufactured using DNA or other processes solely for uses reasonably related to the
manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or veterinary products).
119. See Bio-Tech. Gen. Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 80 F.3d 1553, 1558, 38
U.S.P.Q.2d 1321, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (finding that the District Court did not abuse
its discretion by granting a preliminary injunction to prevent infringement); see also
Mykrolis Corp. v. Pall. Corp., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7523, *4-5 (2004) (citing the four
factors governing preliminary injunctions: “(1) the movant’s reasonable likelihood
of success on the merits; (2) the irreparable harm the movant will suffer absent
preliminary injunctive relief; (3) the balance of hardships tipping in its favor; and
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120

permanent injunctive relief.
The Federal Circuit traditionally has
presumed that injunctive relief should be granted, but the strength of
that presumption was the subject of Supreme Court review as of
121
January 2006. The liability rule that protects the patent entitlement
122
sets a “reasonable royalty” as the floor for damages, but measuring
actual damages in litigation has become an increasingly complex and
costly undertaking.
In general, patent owners seek to be
compensated by one of three measures:
(1) lost profits,
123
(2) reasonable royalty, or (3) a combination of the two.
3.

Duration
As a formal matter, the duration of patent rights is quite rigid.
TRIPS requires that patent rights endure for twenty years from the
124
date the patent application was filed.
The Patent Act implements
this requirement, adding a condition that the patent owner pay
125
The term can be adjusted if
maintenance fees at three intervals.
126
certain kinds of delay in processing a patent application occur.

(4) the impact of the injunction on the public interest”) (quoting Bio-Tech. Gen.
Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 80 F.3d 1553, 1558, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d 1321, 1324 (Fed. Cir.
1996))).
120. 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2000).
121. See MercExchange, LLC v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1339, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d
1225, 1234 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“We therefore see no reason to depart from the general
rule that courts will issue permanent injunctions against patent infringement absent
exceptional circumstances.”), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 733 (2005) (directing parties to
address “[w]hether this Court should reconsider its precedents, including
Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405 (1908), on when it
is appropriate to grant an injunction against a patent infringer”); see also Trans-World
Mfg. Corp. v. Al Nyman & Sons, Inc., 750 F.2d 1552, 1565, 224 U.S.P.Q. 259, 268
(Fed. Cir. 1984) (indicating that damages in the form of license fee adequate).
122. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000); Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., Inc., 56 F.3d 1538,
1544, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d 1065, 1069 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (advising that § 284
indicates only a lower limit of reasonable royalties but foregoing any maximum
limit); TWM Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Dura Corp., 789 F.2d 895, 899-900, 229 U.S.P.Q. 525,
528 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (using “Georgia-Pacific” fifteen-factor analysis derived from
Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120
(S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified and aff’d, 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971)).
123. See George F. Pappas, Damages and Remedies for Patent Infringement, SJ018 ALIABA 67, 69 (2003) (indicating the remedies available to patent owners who have
suffered infringement of a patent).
124. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 68, art. 33.
125. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2000). Utility patents that issue from applications
filed on and after December 12, 1980, are subject to the payment of maintenance
fees necessary to maintain the patent in force. Fees are due 3 2, 7 2 and 11 2 years
from the date the patent is granted. 35 U.S.C. § 41(b) (2000). A six-month grace
period is provided during which the maintenance fee may be paid with a surcharge.
37 C.F.R. § 1.362(e) (2005). Failure to pay the current maintenance fee on time may
result in expiration of the patent.
126. 35 U.S.C. § 154(b) (2000).
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C. Copyright Law
The United States’ treaty obligations impose a baseline of uniform
rights under copyright that are supplemented by some required
tailored protections and the option to further tailor rights in a
number of respects.
1.

Subject matter
The TRIPS Agreement and the Berne Convention require that
copyright protection extend to “every production in the literary,
scientific and artistic domain, whatever may be the mode or form of
127
its expression,” excluding ideas, procedures, methods of operation,
128
Unlike patent law, copyright law’s
or mathematical concepts.
subject matter was legislatively tailored until the beginning of the
twentieth century. In the Copyright Act of 1976, as amended,
Congress departed from the tailored approach to subject matter,
broadly granting copyright to any original work of authorship fixed in
129
any tangible medium of expression.
The threshold for originality is set as low as the Constitution
130
allows.
A work is “original” if it was created by the author rather
than copied from another source and if the work reflects a modicum
131
Courts have found such originality in a commercial
of creativity.
132
133
134
photograph of a vodka bottle, in blank forms, county tax maps,
and have suggested that a seven-note measure in a musical
135
A work meets the fixation
composition is potentially original.
requirement “when its embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, by or
under the authority of the author, is sufficiently permanent or stable
to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated
136
for a period of more than transitory duration.”

127. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 68, art. 9(1) (incorporating by reference Berne
Convention, supra note 67, art. 2(1)).
128. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 68, art. 9(2); see also WCT supra note 67, art. 2.
129. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
130. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
131. See Feist Pub., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361-63 (1991)
(finding that Feist’s white pages owe nothing to an act of authorship and thus are not
original within the meaning of the Constitution); see generally David Nimmer,
Copyright in the Dead Sea Scrolls: Authorship and Originality, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 1 (2001)
(exploring application of originality standard to series of hypothetical cases).
132. Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., 225 F.3d 1068 (9th Cir. 2000).
133. Bucklew v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & Co., 329 F.3d 923 (7th Cir. 2003).
134. County of Suffolk v. First Am. Real Estate Solutions, 261 F.3d 179 (2d Cir.
2001).
135. Swirsky v. Carey, 371 F.3d 841 (9th Cir. 2004).
136. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
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2.

Scope
The United States’ international obligations are scattered among
different agreements. Broadly speaking, the scope of uniform rights
137
138
includes the exclusive rights to reproduce and adapt a protected
work. In addition, authors of most classes of work for which it would
matter have the exclusive right to publicly perform, publicly
139
communicate, or publicly recite a protected work.
The scope of
rights is circumscribed by a user’s privilege to quote the copyrighted
140
141
work. The WIPO treaties add an exclusive distribution right, and
require the creation of “paracopyright” protections for digital rights
142
management technologies.
Finally, Berne requires member states
143
to enforce moral rights, but TRIPS does not incorporate this
144
provision.
The Copyright Act broadly grants the owner the exclusive rights to
authorize or (1) to reproduce the work in copies, (2) to adapt the
145
work, and (3) to distribute copies of the work. These rights extend
to literal copies of the work and to non-literal copies that are
146
substantially similar to the copyright owner’s work.
The right to
prepare derivative works also grants the owner the power to
137. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 68, art. 9(1) (incorporating by reference Berne
Convention, supra note 67, art. 9(1)).
138. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 68, art. 9(1) (incorporating by reference Berne
Convention, supra note 67, art. 8 (translation), art. 12 (general adaptation), art.
14(1) (cinematographic adaptation)).
139. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 68, art. 9(1) (incorporating by reference
Berne Convention, supra note 67, art.11(1) (performance of dramatic, dramaticomusical, and musical works), art. 11 (allowing broadcast or communication by wire
of artistic or literary works), art. 11 (regarding rules on public recitation and
communication of literary work), art. 14 (mentioning communication by wire of
cinematographic works)); see also WCT, supra note 67, art. 8 (establishing a more
general communication right for literary and artistic works); WIPO Performances
and Phonograms Treaty art. 14 (creating a “making available” right for owners of
phonograms). Member States also have the option to add resale rights (a.k.a. droit de
suite) in original works of art and original manuscripts. TRIPS Agreement, supra note
68, art. 9(1) (incorporating by reference Berne Convention, supra note 67, art. 14).
140. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 68, art. 9(1) (incorporating by reference Berne
Convention, supra note 67, art. 10(1)).
141. WCT, supra note 67, art. 6(1); WPPT, supra note 67, art. 12.
142. See WCT, supra note 67, arts. 11-12 (explaining the rights available to owners
of digital copyrights); WPPT, supra note 67, arts. 18-19 (urging additional protections
to owners of digital copyrights).
143. See Berne Convention, supra note 67, art. 6 (defining the concept of moral
rights for copyright owners).
144. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 68, art. 9(1) (expressly excluding Berne
Convention, supra note 67, art. 6 from incorporation).
145. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
146. See generally, e.g., Laureyssens v. Idea Group, Inc., 964 F.2d 131, 140 (1992)
(indicating that copying of a copyrighted article may be performed directly or
indirectly and may violate the statute so long as a substantial similarity is shown
between the original and the offending copy).
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appropriate without liability any unauthorized improvements that are
147
In
derived from or substantially similar to the copyrighted work.
the basic entitlement, Congress has tailored scope by extending to
owners of only certain classes of works the exclusive rights to
148
149
(4) publicly perform, or (5) publicly display the copyrighted
work. Collectively, the exclusive rights under copyright for all classes
of subject matter are limited by a series of provisions, most notably
150
151
fair use and first sale.
The copyright entitlement is protected by a property rule and by
two liability rules. A copyright owner is entitled to temporary and
permanent injunctive relief “on such terms as [a court] may deem
152
reasonable to prevent or restrain infringement of a copyright.”
Liability rule protection comes in two forms. The copyright owner
153
can receive compensation in the form of actual damages.
These
include the portion of the infringer’s profits attributable to
infringement and not otherwise captured in the calculation of
154
damages. In lieu of actual damages, the copyright owner can elect
to receive statutory damages in the range of $750 to $30,000 for each
work infringed, with possible quintupling of the upper bound for
155
willful infringement.
3.

Duration
Under Berne and TRIPS, a copyright must endure at least as long
156
as the life of the author plus fifty years. Under the Copyright Act,
the term of a copyright depends upon its date of creation.

147. See Anderson v. Stallone, 1989 WL 206431, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (C.D.
Cal. 1989) (finding that the script was a derivative work and therefore not entitled to
copyright protection); Lemley, Economics of Improvement, supra note 20, at 1074
(explaining the concept and rules governing derivative works).
148. The general public performance right applies to “literary, musical, dramatic,
and choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual
works.” 17 U.S.C. § 106(4). Sound recordings receive a more limited exclusive right
of public performance by digital audio transmission. 17 U.S.C. § 106(6).
149. The public display right applies to “literary, musical, dramatic, and
choreographic works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works,
including the individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work.” 17
U.S.C. § 106(5).
150. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (detailing the exclusive rights and fair use provisions
governing copyrights).
151. See 17 U.S.C. § 109 (explaining the rights of copy owners to sell such copies).
152. 17 U.S.C. § 502(a).
153. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (providing for actual damages against infringer of a
copyright).
154. 17 U.S.C. § 504(b).
155. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c).
156. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 68, art. 12; Berne Convention, supra note 67,
art. 7(1).
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Until 1976, copyright law divided duration into two terms. Works
157
created on or after January 1, 1978 are subject to a unitary term.
Until 1998, that term coincided with the life-plus-fifty term required
158
by the Berne Convention.
Now, authors receive copyright
protection from the moment a work of authorship is created until
159
If a work is anonymous,
seventy years after the author’s death.
pseudonymous, or is a work-made-for-hire, protection lasts for ninetyfive years from the date of publication or 120 years from the date of
160
creation.
D. Summary
Both patent and copyright law grant largely uniform exclusive
rights to inventors and authors, respectively, subject to a number of
tailored provisions. The Constitution leaves policymakers free to
address the problem of uniformity cost in a variety of ways, but recent
international obligations hem in this discretion considerably.
Nonetheless, the formally uniform subject matter and scope
provisions of both patent and copyright require judicial flexibility in
application which can be used to reduce uniformity cost.
III. OPTIONS AND STANDARDS AS TOOLS TO REDUCE UNIFORMITY COST
The analysis in Part I, shows that uniformity cost is the central
problem for intellectual property policymaking and that perfect
tailoring of entitlements in patent and copyright law would be
theoretically optimal if granting exclusive rights were the only policy
tool available to respond to appropriability problems. Part II, shows
that current law imposes constraints on the use of explicit tailoring to
address uniformity costs. Consequently, while it is important to
analyze how and when tailoring can feasibly be used to reduce
uniformity costs, it is equally important to understand how formal
uniform rights can be, and have been, designed to reduce uniformity
costs through use of real options and flexible subject matter and
scope doctrines.

157. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (creating a term of the life of an author plus seventy
years).
158. Berne Convention, supra note 67, art. 7(1).
159. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a). Until passage of the Copyright Act of 1976, the term of
copyright was divided into an initial and a renewal term. See, e.g., Tyler Ochoa, Patent
and Copyright Term Extension and the Constitution:
A Historical Perspective, 49 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y OF THE U.S.A. 19 (2001) (discussing the terms of copyrights under
the Constitution).
160. 17 U.S.C. § 302(c).
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A. Real Options
The default rules for obtaining, enforcing, and maintaining
intellectual property rights can, and sometimes do, require
affirmative, costly acts on the part of potential intellectual property
owners. Such rules require potential owners to place an option value
on the prospect of protection. Patent law, and, to a lesser extent,
copyright law, use “call options” to reduce uniformity cost by filtering
161
who possesses intellectual property entitlements.
Policymakers have three choices when allocating entitlements:
(1) grant the entitlement to all eligible holders, (2) grant an option
to acquire the entitlement to all eligible holders (a call option), or
(3) grant multi-tiered options to acquire the entitlement; that is, an
automatic grant of an option to acquire an option to acquire the full
162
entitlement, etcetera.
Many legal entitlements, perhaps most, are
in fact options to acquire the entitlement rather than the entitlement
163
itself.
For example, even among rights considered to be
fundamental, options rather than entitlements are common. We say
that a U.S. citizen acquires the “right” to vote in federal elections
164
upon reaching the age of majority. In fact, she acquires the option
to have the right to vote, but she does not acquire the right to vote in
any given election until she exercises the option by registering to
165
vote.
161. In finance circles, options are divided among “call” and “put” options. See,
e.g., Risk Glossary: Options, available at http://www.riskglossary.com/articles/option.
htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2006). A call option gives the holder the option to purchase
an asset at a specified price, and a put option gives the holder the option to sell an
asset at a specified price. Id. Option contracts generally include certain temporal
constraints, such as date on which the option expires or constraints on when the
option may be exercised. See id. (distinguishing among American (exercise any time
up to expiration date), European (exercise only on expiration date), and Bermuda
(exercise at specified dates prior to expiration) options).
162. Other layers of complexity can be added. For example, when the law directly
grants an entitlement, whether the holder has a put option (the option to alienate)
will vary depending upon the transaction structure governing the entitlement.
163. See, e.g., IAN AYRES, OPTIONAL LAW: THE STRUCTURE OF LEGAL ENTITLEMENTS,
(Univ. of Chicago Press 2006); Oren Bar-Gill, Pricing Legal Options: A Behavioral
Perspective, (working paper, 2005), available at http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.
cgi?article=1019&context=nyu/lewp (last visited Mar. 1, 2006) (applying the
economic ‘pricing option’ concept to legal issues).
164. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI § 1 (making eighteen the age of majority for
voting purposes).
165. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1971(e) (2000) (implementing the Fifteenth
Amendment and stating that
[w]hen used in the subsection, the word “vote” includes all action necessary to
make a vote effective including, but not limited to, registration or other action
required by State law prerequisite to voting, casting a ballot, and having such
ballot counted and included in the appropriate totals of votes cast with respect to
candidates for public office and propositions for which votes are received in an
election
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When policymakers choose options over direct grants of
entitlements, the option price performs a filtering function. As the
costs of exercising the option increase, the percentage of actual
entitlement holders will decrease. With the option to vote, Jim Crow
laws in the South were designed to increase the cost of exercising the
166
option, while the “motor voter” law was designed to bring the
167
option cost down significantly.
Option prices also reveal
information about the value of the entitlement. One goal of
entitlement design can be to force private actors to reveal their
168
private valuations of options regulated by legal rules.
In patent and copyright law, call options serve two important
economic functions:
(1) limiting the number of entitlement
holders, and thereby reducing social costs by tailoring the number of
entitlements granted, and (2) producing coarse-grained information
about the private valuation of the entitlement. Of course, the
substantial cost of litigation also functions as a real option that
reduces uniformity cost. The focus of analysis here, however, is use of
options in entitlement design to reduce uniformity cost.
Relatively recent changes in copyright law have greatly diminished
the filtering function that real options once played in the form of
renewal terms and formalities. In intellectual property law, real
options promote social welfare when the benefits of sorting
innovations and nourishing the public domain outweigh the costs of
forcing entitlement bearers to calculate an option value with respect
to their innovations and expend resources to purchase the option in
169
order to enjoy protection.
1.

Patent
Patent law deploys call options along both the subject matter and
duration dimensions. With respect to subject matter, not every

).
166. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1971(a)(2)(C) (limiting the use of literacy tests as
prerequisites for voting in response to abuse of such practices to achieve racially
discriminatory objectives).
167. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b)(1) (stating that the purpose of motor-voter
registration is “to establish procedures that will increase the number of eligible
citizens who register to vote in elections for Federal office”).
168. See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Revealing Options, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1399, 1402
(2005) (exploring a mechanism for structuring legal entitlements so as to induce
people to reveal their valuations truthfully by requiring entitlement holders to craft
options to which others can respond).
169. See Long, Information Costs, supra note 64, at 496 (commenting that
information disclosure rules can increase the overall social welfare but only are
“efficient so long as they lower net costs to observers by more than they raise net
costs to owners”).
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inventor of a new, useful, and non-obvious process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter receives a patent because a
potential patentee must undergo a time-consuming and expensive
170
process to prosecute his or her claim to a patent.
The potential
patentee must assess the option value or strike price of patent
protection and compare that to the costs of exercising the option
171
through patent prosecution. The option value of patent protection
in a given case usually is comparative because the potential patentee
generally also has the options to keep trade secret protection or
172
acquire the benefits of defensive publication.
When a potential
patentee forgoes protection, society is spared the associated social
173
costs. As one might expect, real options reduce Type I uniformity
174
costs by weeding out low-value inventions across all industries.
Empirical research indicates that real options also reduce Type II
uniformity costs because the value placed on patent protection
175
generally varies by industry.
Call options along the duration dimension also play an important,
176
The
and often overlooked, role in reducing uniformity cost.
170. A benchmark for the out-of-pocket expenses of patent prosecution is
$20,000, although costs will vary with complexity. See, e.g., Clarisa Long, Patent
Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 639 n.44 (2002) [hereinafter Long, Patent Signals]
(listing several differing sources that estimate the range of production costs and
noting that $20,000 is a conservative estimate).
171. Cf. F. Russell Denton & Paul J. Heald, Random Walks, Non-Cooperative Games,
And The Complex Mathematics Of Patent Pricing, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 1175, 1180 (2003)
(adapting pricing methodology for stock options to pricing options to license a
patent).
172. See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Promise And Perils Of Strategic Publication To
Create Prior Art: A Response To Professor Parchomovsky, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2358, 2369
(2000) (identifying when defensive publication is attractive in a patent race context);
see also Prior Art Database, www.ip.com/pad/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2005) (providing a
searchable online database for the defensive publication of technical disclosure
documents and the creation of prior art).
173. It will not always be the case that society gains a net benefit when a potential
patentee fails to exercise the option. If the patentee chooses to keep the invention
secret, society loses the benefits of disclosure, which may outweigh the social costs
associated with any potential market power the patent may confer.
174. See Long, Patent Signals, supra note 170, at 626-27 & n.2 (noting that “when
the value of intellectual property rights is framed purely in terms of exclusivity and
rents, worthless patents abound”).
175. See, e.g., Cohen et al., Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent, supra note 33, at 911 (showing industry-specific variation in value assigned to patent protection);
Richard C. Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and
Development, in 1987 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 783, 794-97 (1987)
(demonstrating that the role of patents as means for appropriating returns from
research and development investments varies among industries).
176. See, e.g., Lunney, Quiet Revolution, supra note 6, at 51-52 (remarking that
although maintenance fees would “not strictly limit the duration of protection to that
necessary to ensure a given innovation . . ., at the very least, it ensures that protection
will end once the expected rents from an additional term of protection . . . exceed
the costs of applying for the extension”); Frank Partnoy, Finance and Patent Length 37
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formally uniform twenty-year term of patent protection is, in
substance, quite heterogeneous. By conditioning protection on
payment of maintenance fees, the Patent Act forces the patent owner
periodically to place an option value on continued protection and to
reveal something about that valuation. A patent owner’s decision not
to pay the relatively modest maintenance fees is a decision to
177
dedicate the invention to the public domain. One study shows that
the owners of more than half of all patents choose to dedicate their
inventions to the public domain prior to the expiration of the full
178
twenty-year term. Data for fee payments during the ten-year period
from 1994 to 2003 show that, on average, eighteen percent of patent
owners placed little value on their patents and permitted protection
to lapse at the 3.5 year mark; forty-two percent of patent owners who
had proceeded past the first stage chose not to extend protection at
the 7.5 year mark; and of those patentees who previously had
purchased extended protection, fully sixty-four percent chose to end
179
the patent term at the 11.5 year mark. As these data demonstrate,
patent law’s maintenance-fee provision serves to render a uniformlydefined dimension of patent rights more context-sensitive. In a
sense, patent owners self-tailor the duration of protection.
By viewing these rules as filters, the uniformity-cost perspective
reframes at least two debates that have engaged economicallyoriented scholars. First, the “patent quality” debate can be recast as a
debate about setting the right price for the option of patent
protection. Most commentators appear to agree that some real
180
option should be placed along the subject matter dimension.
There also seems to be consensus that the option price should be
relatively high, by requiring prosecution and examination rather than
(U. San Diego Sch. of Law, Law and Economics Research Paper No. 19, 2001),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=285144 (recognizing maintenance fees as a
form of real option).
177. See, e.g., Kimberly A. Moore, Worthless Patents, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1521,
1525-26 (2006) (discussing the reasons patent owners may have for allowing their
patents to expire by not paying maintenance fees).
178. See id. at 8 (claiming that 53.71% of all patentees permit protection to lapse
for failure to pay maintenance fees); see also Suzanne Scotchmer, On the Optimality of
the Patent Renewal System, 30 RAND J. OF ECON. 181, 182 (1999) (citing economic
research showing that “[a] regularity across technology classes and countries is that
no more than 50% of patents are maintained more than ten years” and that “there is
considerable variance in renewal rates if patents are categorized by technology and
nationality of owner”) (citations omitted).
179. See Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, supra note 15, at
15 (listing the percentage of patents renewed at 3.5 years, 7.5 years, and 11.5 years
per year between 1994 and 2003, and noting that the renewal data alone cannot be
used to calculate the average value of patents).
180. See, e.g., infra notes 181-182.
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181

mere registration.
Most scholarly debate has focused on whether
the mesh of the current examination filter should be made smaller to
182
restrict the flow of invalid patents into the system. Alternatively, the
examination option could be tiered to force greater revelation of an
183
inventor’s private valuation of the invention. In general, improving
quality control in the PTO would tend to increase the option value
184
necessary to make pursuing patent protection cost-justified.
Second, the extensive economic literature on optimal patent
duration generally overlooks the role of real options either by
assuming a uniform term or contemplating variability without analysis
of how it might be implemented. Some analysts seek to make the
case for the efficiency of a uniform term, not recognizing that real
185
options render actual terms heterogeneous.
The bulk of the
literature, however, demonstrates theoretically that uniform duration
181. See, e.g., Shubha Ghosh, Patents and the Regulatory State: Rethinking the Patent
Bargain Metaphor After Eldred, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1315, 1344 (2004) (analyzing
trade-offs between registration and prosecution); see also John H. Duffy, Harmony and
Diversity in Global Patent Law, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 685, 713-15 (2002) (providing a
brief historical summary of comparative experiences with examination and
registration systems). See generally F. Scott Kieff, The Case For Registering Patents and the
Law and Economics Of Present Patent-Obtaining Rules, 45 B.C. L. REV. 55, 70-71 (2003)
(using a hypothetical registration system to illustrate social benefits of prosecution
system).
182. See generally Shubha Ghosh & Jay Kesan, What Do Patents Purchase? In Search Of
Optimal Ignorance In The Patent Office, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 1219, 1226 (2004) (arguing
that a closer review of more precise applications would improve the quality of
patents); Kieff, supra note 181, at 123 (concluding that increased scrutiny of patent
applications would effect the present system negatively); Symposium, 19 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1 (2004) (responding to Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent
Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495 (2001), with most authors arguing for greater
investments in patent quality); Jay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo, Why ‘Bad’ Patents
Survive in the Market and How Should We Change?—The Private and Social Costs of Patents
9 (Ill. Law & Econ. Working Papers Series, Working Paper No. LE05-004, 2005),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=688005 (supporting the use of administrative
patent oppositions to improve the quality of patents).
183. See generally Mark A. Lemley, Douglas Lichtman & Bhaven N. Sampat, What To
Do About Bad Patents, 28 REGULATION 10, 12 (2005) (suggesting that a strong
presumption of validity for an issued patent could be turned into an option that
inventors could purchase by paying for a thoroughgoing examination).
184. The portfolio strategy suggests that the option value has to be calculated not
only in reference to potential revenues from the exploitation of individual inventions
but also from revenues associated with the marginal increase in portfolio value. See
generally Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, supra note 15, at 56 (“The true value of patents inheres not in their individual worth, but in their
aggregation into a collection of related patents—a patent portfolio.”). Portfolio
value likely varies by industry, particularly because some individual pharmaceutical
patents carry significant value. See generally John R. Allison et al., Valuable Patents, 92
GEO. L.J. 435, 437-39 (2004) (reporting the results of an empirical study of litigated
patents).
185. See, e.g., D.G. McFetridge & M. Rafiquzzaman, The Scope and Duration of the
Patent Right and the Nature of Research Rivalry, 8 RESEARCH IN L. & ECON. 91, 117 (1986)
(“A good case can be made for the existing patent term if one is willing to assume
that the ability to invent is not widely distributed.”).
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for all patents is inefficient because optimal patent life is
186
Some analysts recognize what I have named Type II
conditional.
uniformity costs and have suggested that patent terms should be
187
tailored to vary by industry. Other analysts tend to assume a one-toone relation between patents and products and assert that patent life
188
These analyses
optimally would be tailored for each product.
generally overlook a deep conceptual tension in analyzing the
conditions for perfectly-tailored protection. Patents are second-best
189
solutions to appropriability problems.
If policymakers had
sufficient information about the value of individual inventions to
tailor duration for each invention, some form of direct compensation

186. In the foundational work for this enterprise, Professor Nordhaus’s model
acknowledges that “the optimal life is extremely sensitive to changes in the
parameters of the system,” but he then accepts that actual life is a uniform term.
WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, INVENTION, GROWTH, AND WELFARE:
A THEORETICAL
TREATMENT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 81 (1969). In 1969, U.S. patent law did not
impose maintenance fees, so his assumption of a uniform term is more
understandable than for post-1982 analyses.
187. See, e.g., M.H.I. Dore, J. Kushner & I. Masse, The Optimal Length of a Patent with
Variable Output Elasticity and Returns to Scale in R&D, 21 ATLANTIC ECON. J. 10, 11, 19,
23 (1993) (explicitly recognizing uniformity cost, modeling patent duration on perinvention according to demand, and output elasticities, which correspond to
industry maturity); Nancy T. Gallini, Patent Policy and Costly Imitation, 23 RAND J. OF
ECON. 52, 62-63 (1992) (suggesting that “a narrow patent may accelerate innovation
by allowing future generations of the innovation to be developed”); F.M. Scherer,
Nordhaus’ Theory of Optimal Patent Life: A Geometric Reinterpretation, 62 AM. ECON. REV.
422, 426-27 (1972) (recognizing the uniformity cost of single patent duration
whenever other barriers to imitation permit sufficient innovator appropriation and
suggesting compulsory licensing as a form of tailoring); Michael Waterson, The
Economics of Product Patents, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 860, 869 (1990) (noting the difficulty
of making patent law industry specific); Donald J. Wright, Optimal Patent Breadth and
Length with Costly Imitation, 17 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 419, 432 (1999) (arguing that
product specific patents are optimal but recognizing that they require likely
unavailable information on market structure, demand conditions, and imitation cost
structures).
188. See, e.g., Partha Dasgupta & Joseph Stiglitz, Uncertainty, Industrial Structure, and
the Speed of R&D, 11 BELL J. ECON. 1, 19 (1980) (modeling variable effects of patent
life); Lawrence M. DeBrock, Market Structure, Innovation, and Optimal Patent Life, 28
J.L. & ECON. 223, 233-34 (1985) (illustrating how “the government can vary patentlife policy to maximize the constrained social welfare”); Vincenzo Denicolò, Patent
Races and Optimal Patent Breadth and Length, 44 J. OF INDUS. ECON. 249, 263 (1996)
(demonstrating that “the patent breadth-length optimal mix depends in a subtle
way . . . on the relationship between social welfare and post-innovation products . . .
and the breadth of the patent”); Richard Gilbert & Carl Shapiro, Optimal Patent
Length and Breadth, 21 RAND J. OF ECON. 106, 111-12 (1990) (concluding that “optimal
policy calls for infinitely-lived patents whenever patent breadth is increasingly costly
in terms of deadweight loss”); Manfredi La Manna, Ross Macleod, & David de Meza,
The Case for Permissive Patents, 33 EUROPEAN ECON. REV. 1427, 1430 (1989) (modeling
variable patent life in a permissive patent system).
189. Cf. DeBrock, supra note 188, at 226 (“However, it should be clear that such a
first-best situation is not relevant in a world where policymakers are forced to use an
inherently second-best tool: patent protection.”).
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likely would be a more efficient way to finance innovation than a
190
patent.
Because policymakers will never have perfect information but may
be in a position to acquire sufficient information to tailor along
industry-specific or technology-specific lines, tailoring may be
preferable for addressing Type II uniformity costs. As the discussion
in Part II demonstrates, however, tailoring patent duration would be
191
very difficult. Real options address at least some Type II uniformity
costs and can be quite effective in reducing Type I costs. The
uniformity-cost perspective suggests that future research on the
patent system should analyze option pricing rather than either
192
assuming a uniform term or modeling per-invention variability.
2.

Copyright
In copyright law, the uniformity-cost perspective reveals how recent
changes that eliminate or constrict real options have increased the
social costs of copyright law. Traditionally, U.S. copyright law tracked
patent law by deploying real options along the subject matter and
duration dimensions. Prior to enactment of the Copyright Act of
1976, authors arguably received direct common law entitlements to
193
prohibit unauthorized publication.
If and when the author chose
190. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV.
L. REV. 1813, 1844 (1984) (acknowledging that as patent policy becomes more casespecific, the justification for patent over direct reward weakens).
191. See supra Parts II.B, C (analyzing provisions requiring formally uniform patent
duration); see also M.K. Berkowitz & Y. Kotowitz, Patent Policy in an Open Economy, 15
CANADIAN J. ECON. 1, 12 (1982) (recognizing that “[i]ndustrial structure of invention
may be different in different industries, calling for drastically different patent
policies” but concluding that because patent policy has traditionally been uniform,
scope and duration must reflect conditions for the majority of industries); John F.
Duffy, A Minimum Optimal Patent Term 9 (Working Paper, 2003), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=354282 (arguing that even if it’s theoretically efficient to
vary patent duration by sector, administrative costs and risks of wasteful rent-seeking
make tailored duration unattractive).
192. Suzanne Scotchmer is the leading thinker along these lines. See generally
Suzanne Scotchmer, On the Optimality of the Patent Renewal System, 30 RAND J. OF ECON.
181 (1999) (modeling option prices under certain conditions); see also Moore, supra
note 177, at 1551-52 (advocating study of option design, such as annual maintenance
fees, to account for industry variation and to improve social welfare); Partnoy, supra
note 176, at 34-37 (suggesting varying option prices as a means of regulating effective
patent duration); cf. Ted O’Donoghue, Suzanne Scotchmer & Jacques-François
Thisse, Patent Breadth, Patent Life, and the Pace of Technological Progress, 7 J. ECON. &
MGMT. STRATEGY 1, 24-25 (1998) (modeling a patent’s “effective” life based on patent
breadth’s effects on demand for invention); Helen Weeds, Strategic Delay in a Real
Options Model of R&D Competition, 69 REV. ECON. STUD. 729 (2001) (applying option
theory to model investment decisions in research and development). The concept of
effective life could be extended to include patent owner’s response to real options as
well.
193. See, e.g., Birnbaum v. United States, 588 F.2d 319, 326 (2d Cir. 1978)
(describing “common law copyright” as more limited to right of first publication);
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to publish the work, however, any common law protection was
extinguished and federal protection was conditioned on exercise of
the option—complying with the notice, registration, and deposit
194
requirements. An author who chose to publish without complying
with these so-called “formalities” effectively chose to dedicate the
work to the public domain, thereby eliminating the social costs of
195
copyright with respect to that work.
The exercise price for copyright protection was considerably lower
than for patent protection because registration fees were cheaper
than patent filing fees and copyright registration involved no
examination initially and only very cursory examination
196
Even with the lower strike price, during the early
subsequently.
years of copyright in the late eighteenth century, very few copyright
owners valued the option of protection sufficiently to exercise their
197
options. Even well into the most recent years in which registration
was required for published works, the total number of registrations
198
was less than 600,000.
Policymakers reduced the effectiveness of
the filtering function that the registration-and-notice requirements
played when the United States chose to adhere to the Berne
Convention, which requires that member states grant the entitlement
199
itself rather than an option to acquire the entitlement.
Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Information As Speech, Information As Goods:
Some
Thoughts On Marketplaces And The Bill Of Rights, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 665, 694 &
n.205 (1992) (discussing possible common law copyright in unpublished works).
194. In the 1909 Act, Congress slightly relaxed these by requiring notice only to
secure protection and requiring registration and deposit as prerequisites for a
copyright infringement action. See Washingtonian Publ’g Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S.
30, 36-39 (1939) (reviewing legislative history and rejecting the claim that postpublication infringements occurring prior to registration and deposit are immune
from suit).
195. See, e.g., Scherr v. Universal Match Corp., 297 F. Supp. 107, 112 (S.D.N.Y.
1967) (concluding that a government statue exhibited without visible notice of
copyright or any restrictions regarding copying constituted a divestive publication),
aff’d on other grounds, 417 F.2d 497 (2d Cir. 1969).
196. See LANDES & POSNER, ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra note 12, at 235 (stating
that registration fees climbed from $10 to $20 in 1991, to $30 in 2000, while the
renewal fee increased from $12 in 1991 to $45 in 2000).
197. See, e.g., WILLIAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE 33 (1994)
[hereinafter PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW] (reporting that 15,000 titles were published in
the United States between 1790 to 1800 and evidence of only 779 copyright
registrations has been found).
198. See LANDES & POSNER, ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra note 12, at 236
(illustrating in graph form the number of registrations between 1910 and 2000, and
indicating that the number of registrations in 1989 was less than 600,000); Annual
Report of the Register of Copyrights (2002), http://www.copyright.gov/reports/ann
ual/2002/registrations.html (showing that total pre-1989 registrations peaked at
581,276 in 1987).
199. See supra Part II.C (analyzing the Berne Convention and the TRIPS
Agreement); see also Kahle v. Ashcroft, No. 04-1127, 2004 WL 2663157 (N.D. Cal.
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Current law, however, has not entirely abandoned real options.
Instead, authors of works in the United States receive both a call
200
option and a put option along the subject matter dimension.
Although the copyright entitlement is granted automatically as soon
as an original work of authorship is fixed in a tangible medium of
expression, the entitlement is not fully functional. The entitlement
can be assigned or licensed, and alleged infringers can be threatened
201
by cease-and-desist letters. Authors of works in the United States or
their assigns, however, must still exercise a call option, which requires
registration with the Copyright Office and is subject to minimal
202
examination, to enforce the entitlement in federal court.
203
The Section 411 call option still performs a filtering function, but
it is much less effective at reducing uniformity cost than pre-1989 law.
Under prior law, the registration-and-notice filter reduced uniformity
costs because a user coming upon a published, unregistered work or
a published work without a copyright notice was free to make his or
her desired use of the information. Under current law, a potential
user must now assume that a work of authorship, even one published
without notice, is protected and cannot be used without a license
(unless the desired use is a privileged use under the law), even if the
author has no intention of enforcing rights or would encourage the
desired use.
In order to regain some of the former benefits provided by the real
option on copyrightable subject matter, efforts are underway to make
public licensing or public dedication less expensive and easier to
employ for authors interested in exercising the put option that
204
current law now grants.
Although these efforts reduce uniformity
2004) (rejecting plaintiffs’ argument that the removal of traditional real options
violates Clause 8 and the First Amendment) (appeal filed).
200. The option to alienate the copyright entitlement is clouded. Although sale
and licensing are readily done, dedication of the entitlement to the public domain is
slightly less certain because of the inalienable termination-of-transfers provisions. See
17 U.S.C. § 201(d) (2000) (allowing for the transfer of ownership of a copyright in
whole or in part); 17 U.S.C. § 203 (specifying the conditions under which copyright
transfer will be terminated and the effects of that termination).
201. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(d) (allowing for the transfer of ownership of a copyright
in whole or in part); 17 U.S.C. § 501 (permitting copyright owners to institute actions
against copyright infringers).
202. See 17 U.S.C. § 411 (mandating that copyright claims be properly registered
before any copyright infringement actions are instituted); William F. Patry, Does
Copyright
Registration
Matter?,
The
Patry
Copyright
Blog,
http://williampatry.blogspot.com/ (June 7, 2005, 07:34 EST) (emphasizing that
proper registration is a prerequisite for an infringement action and that failure to do
so will result in dismissal).
203. See 17 U.S.C. § 411 (applying a registration requirement in copyright law).
204. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, A New Dynamism in the Public Domain, 71 U. CHI. L.
REV. 183, 184, 186, 197 (2004) (describing contractual responses to imbalanced
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cost by promoting reallocation of entitlements, transaction costs for
doing so remain positive. On balance, U.S. adherence to the Berne
Convention has exacerbated uniformity cost along the subject matter
dimension.
Matters are worse with respect to copyright duration. Until 1976,
copyright law divided duration into two terms, which served to vary
the effective term of protection because the renewal procedure acted
205
as a real option similar to patent law’s maintenance fees.
The
Copyright Act of 1976 removed this filter by adopting a life-plus-fifty
206
term, recently extended to life-plus-seventy.
This change has
rendered the duration dimension of copyright law particularly
insensitive to context, as was made dramatically evident by the
207
submissions to the Supreme Court in Eldred v. Ashcroft.
Implicitly
recognizing the problem of uniformity cost, the Copyright Office
recently launched a proposal to broaden the rights of libraries and
208
archives with respect to “orphan works.”
Although this effort is
welcome, it does not materially alter the substantial social costs
209
imposed by removing the real option of renewable terms.
The increase in social costs imposed by a substantively uniform
term of copyright protection has led even leading law-and-economics
scholars William Landes and Richard Posner, who once praised the
210
life-plus-fifty term as economically efficient,
to call for
reestablishing a real option along copyright law’s duration
211
dimension. Some policymakers have made modest proposals along
public law).
205. See supra notes 176-179 and accompanying text (discussing option value and
the effect of maintenance fees on patent duration); LANDES & POSNER, ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE, supra note 12, at 235-49 (analyzing copyright renewal data to show the
strong filtering effect of renewal term and the weaker, but significant, effect of
modest changes in registration and renewal fees).
206. See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2000) (requiring that copyrights created on or after
Jan. 1, 1978, endure for seventy years after the author’s death). Until the passage of
the Copyright Act of 1976, the term of copyright was divided into two renewable
terms. See Ochoa, supra note 159, at 22-23, 42-43 (noting that the 1976 Act was
generally accepted as part of copyright reform codifying principles under the 1909
Act and requirements of the Berne Convention).
207. See generally Submission of Amici in support of Petitioners, Eldred v. Ashcroft
Legal Documents: Supreme Court, http://eldred.cc/legal/supremecourt.html (last
visited Feb. 26, 2006) (arguing that the Copyright Clause limits the means by which
Congress can achieve its statutory purpose).
208. See U.S. Copyright Office, Notice of Inquiry, Orphan Works, 70 Fed. Reg.
3739 (Jan. 26, 2005) (seeking comment on recommended solutions for works whose
copyright owner(s) cannot be identified or located).
209. See, e.g., Editorial, Rip. Mix. Burn., THE ECONOMIST, July 2, 2005 (urging
Congress to enact fourteen-year renewable copyright terms).
210. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law,
18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 362-63 (1989).
211. See LANDES & POSNER, ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra note 12, at 244 (noting

CARROLL.OFFTOPRINTER

2006]

5/20/2006 1:46:49 PM

ONE FOR ALL

889

212

these lines. The uniformity-cost perspective underscores why such
measures are needed.
3.

Scope options
The full range of real options as a policy tool to reduce uniformity
cost has not been explored in the literature. Although some
commentators have wrestled with the merits of registration versus
examination procedures along the subject matter dimension and
others have discussed the relative merits of renewable terms or
maintenance fees along the duration dimension, few have discussed
how the benefits of real options could be realized along the scope
dimension of copyright or patent entitlements.
Consider the scope of copyright law, for example. Copyright
prohibits four kinds of copying:
(1) complete duplication,
(2) partial duplication, (3) creation of a work substantially similar to
the whole, and (4) creation of a work with a substantially similar
213
part. At a minimum, a copyright owner should receive the right to
prohibit complete duplication if copyright is to serve as any kind of
solution to the appropriability problem. Copyright law historically
was restricted in scope to this kind of copying and gradually has
expanded to grant the owner the entitlement to control these other
forms of copying as well. It would be possible to impose a call option
filter by conditioning the grant of the right to control the other three
kinds of copying on either payment of a modest fee and/or
registration of the claim to control these uses.
Take, for example, the scope of copyright in a novel. If a real
option were in place, the author would receive the exclusive right to
complete duplication at the time copyright vests. If the author also
would like to have the rights to prepare derivative works from the
novel, such as motion pictures or theatrical adaptations, the author
would have to pay a small fee and register the claim with the
Copyright Office. There already is a well-established market for

that “[c]urrent copyright law does not differentiate among different types of work”
and arguing that “[a] system of indefinite renewals would automatically distinguish
the enduring from the ephemeral”); see also id. at 249 (“[A] system of indefinite
renewals . . . will separate valuable works in which continued copyright protection
may be socially efficient from works in which the cost of continuing that protection
exceeds the sum of administrative and access . . . costs.”).
212. See Public Domain Enhancement Act, H.R. 2408, 109th Cong. (May 17, 2005)
(proposing an amendment to Title 17 of the U.S. Code to allow abandoned
copyrighted works to enter the public domain after fifty years).
213. See 4-13 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03 (discussing what constitutes copying
and defining the concept of substantial similarity).
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“movie rights,” that is, the option to adapt a novel for use in a film.
Adding a real option into the scope dimension simply would give the
public a right to participate in this market as well. Novelists who
placed little or no value on the adaptation option effectively would
dedicate that right to the public domain, potentially making
filmmaking a marginally less expensive enterprise. Similarly, with
musical works and sound recordings, one could imagine a real option
to control the right to make partial duplication in the form of digital
samples. Recent evidence indicates that some copyright owners
215
would not purchase the partial duplication option.
Even though scope options potentially would reduce uniformity
costs, the administrative costs of implementation could be quite
216
significant. The point here is not to advocate for adoption of real
options for the scope of intellectual property rights, but instead to
demonstrate that the option-value conception captures much of the
debate about subject matter and duration and that this concept could
be extended to scope as well.
B. Standards in Intellectual Property Entitlements
One reason that real options may not be used along the scope
dimension of patent and copyright law is that both bodies of law
reduce uniformity costs by adopting standards rather than rules to
217
define the scope and subject matter dimensions. This flexibility can
214. See Douglas Y’Barbo, Aesthetic Ambition Versus Commercial Appeal: Adapting
Novels to Film and the Copyright Law, 10 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 299, 310-12 (1998)
(describing the appeal of adapting novels for use in film in the movie industry and
the lucrative market for movie rights).
215. See, e.g., Michael W. Carroll, The Struggle for Music Copyright, 57 FLA. L. REV.
907, 961 (2005) (describing a Wired magazine compilation CD comprised of tracks
from famous artists all released under a Creative Commons sampling license).
Switching the default from automatic protection with the option of open licensing to
open resource with the option of closing it off would increase the pool of resources
from which samples could be drawn.
216. See Duffy, supra note 191, at 14 (noting that the administrative costs of
tailored duration make it unattractive).
217. The rules/standards literature is substantial. See, e.g., MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE
TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 3, 15-63 (1987) (highlighting “the contradiction between
a commitment to mechanically applicable rules as the appropriate form for resolving
disputes . . . and a commitment to situation-sensitive, ad-hoc standards”); FREDERICK
SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED
DECISIONMAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 104 (1991) (arguing that “it is a mistake to
equate the dimension of ruleness with the dimension of specificity”); Louis Kaplow,
Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 560 (1992) (arguing
that the only difference between rules and standards “is the extent to which efforts to
give content to the law are undertaken before or after individuals act”); Duncan
Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 16871713 (1976) (assessing the formal concept of rules as legal form and distinguishing
rules from standards); Eric A. Posner, Standards, Rules, and Social Norms, 21 HARV. J.L.

CARROLL.OFFTOPRINTER

2006]

5/20/2006 1:46:49 PM

ONE FOR ALL

891

serve to reduce uniformity costs by adapting the availability and scope
of protection to the appropriability conditions that prevail in specific
contexts. By contrast, both patent and copyright law use rules to
specify duration and rely on real options, in the case of patent law, to
reduce uniformity costs.
Legal standards confer interpretive discretion on adjudicators and,
generally, the more broadly a standard is stated, the more discretion
218
adjudicators have. This interpretive discretion can be deployed ad
hoc or systematically. With respect to the scope of intellectual
property rights, courts can choose to use flexible doctrines to strike
the incentives-access balance either on a per-work or per-invention
basis, or more broadly along industry-specific or technology-specific
lines. For purposes of this discussion, this subsection addresses only
the ways in which intellectual property scope and subject matter
doctrines reduce uniformity costs by requiring ad hoc balancing.
The effectiveness of judicial interpretation as a means of rendering
uniform intellectual property rights more context-sensitive depends
on the dimension of rights being adapted. With regard to subject
matter, courts have a certain amount of discretion to determine
219
whether a work is sufficiently original or to draw the line between
& PUB. POL’Y 101, 116-17 (1997) (concluding that rules promote autonomy and
individual values, whereas standards encourage conformity to state goals); Margaret
Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REV. 781, 783-90 (1989)
(analyzing rules as either instrumental or substantive); Carol M. Rose, Crystals and
Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 592-93 (1988) (refusing to accept that
there is a choice between standards and rules and arguing that “we seem to be stuck
with both” or “oscillate between them”); Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA
L. REV. 379, 379-430 (1985) (discussing the relationship between rules and standards
and concluding that “much of legal argumentation is simply an exercise in the
formalistic mechanisms of a dialectic which doesn’t go anywhere”); Cass R. Sunstein,
Problems With Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953, 958 (1995) (arguing that “the disadvantages
of rules . . . are often insufficiently appreciated, and that legal systems sometimes do
and should abandon rules in favor of a form of casuistry”).
218. For present purposes, the following definitions make the point:
(a) Rules.—A legal directive is “rule”-like when it binds a decisionmaker to
respond in a determinate way to the presence of delimited triggering facts.
....
(b) Standards.—A legal directive is “standard”-like when it tends to collapse
decisionmaking back into the direct application of the background principle
or policy to a fact situation.
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV.
22, 58 (1992). It is critical that “the decisionmaker” be understood to include the
enforcer as well as the adjudicator. A speed limit would appear to be a paradigmatic
rule, but it becomes a standard in the hands of an enforcer who relies on a set of
contextual factors when deciding how to enforce the provision.
219. See Trotter Hardy, The Copyrightability of New Works of Authorship:
“XML
Schemas” as an Example, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 855, 858-61 (2001) (outlining several
methods that courts have used to determine whether a work is sufficiently original to
be copyrighted, including the use of dictionaries to compare emerging technologies
to the text the Copyright Act, the analysis of whether an idea for a work merges with
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unprotected idea and protected expression. Similarly, determining
220
whether a process is protectible or whether a biological organism is
221
a “machine,” a “manufacture,” or “composition of matter,” requires
the exercise of interpretive discretion through which the courts can
tailor protection. As with subject matter, the scope doctrines under
both patent and copyright law delegate to courts substantial
discretion that can be exercised to tailor the balance of incentives
and access for specific types of information. With regard to duration,
however, the courts have little discretion to tailor the term of
protection directly. Nonetheless, some commentators have shown
that courts can use their discretion over scope to limit or enhance the
222
effective duration of protection.
When courts disagree with a
legislative judgment to tailor protection, judicial interpretation also
can be used to make intellectual property rights more uniform by
223
subverting legislative tailoring.
1.

Patent
Patent law deploys standards rather than rules along the subject
224
matter and scope dimensions.
Although helpful, use of standards
the expression of that work, or the consideration of competing social policies
underlying the copyrightability of the work).
220. See State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368,
1375, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1596, 1599 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding methods of doing
business to be patentable “processes”).
221. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308-09 (1980) (holding humanmade bacteria not naturally occurring to be patentable subject matter).
222. See Justin Hughes, Fair Use Across Time, 50 UCLA L. REV. 775, 776-77 (2003)
(arguing that courts should examine the market for a copyrighted work over a
period of time in order to determine whether future uses of that work are infringing
or non-infringing); Joseph P. Liu, Copyright and Time: A Proposal, 101 MICH. L. REV.
409, 411 (2002) (voicing that courts should not assume that the scope of protection
afforded during copyright terms is “constant or unaffected” by the passage of time
and that courts should consider the passage of time when setting the duration of
copyright terms).
223. See, e.g., Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250-51
(1903) (construing the definition of copyrightable subject matter containing “the
words ‘engraving,’ ‘cut’ and ‘print’ applicable only to pictorial illustrations or works
connected with the fine arts” and rendering nugatory the fine arts limitation on
grounds that “[i]t would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the
law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations”); cf.
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 318 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (accusing the majority of
overriding congressional intent to tailor patent rights in inventions comprising living
organisms); J.E.M. AG Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Intern., Inc., 534 U.S. 124
(2001) (citing Chakrabarty as controlling precedent in holding that tailored
protection for plant varieties is not exclusive of the general utility patent protection
for the same subject matter).
224. See Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers, supra note 4, at 1642-58 (identifying nine
such patent law standards as “policy levers”:
(1) abstract ideas, (2) utility,
(3) experimental use, (4) skill in the art, (5) secondary considerations, (6) written
description, (7) doctrine of equivalents, (8) pioneering patents, (9) reverse doctrine
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along the subject matter dimension permits only coarse-grained
exercise of interpretive discretion because an adjudicator can choose
only between applying all or no rights to a particular innovation or
class of innovations. The standards that govern patent scope, by
contrast, supply a wider range of responses to uniformity cost.
a.

Subject matter

The formally uniform statutory definition of patentable subject
matter is broadly stated and therefore confers a considerable degree
of interpretive discretion on the federal courts and the PTO. The
courts have resisted using discretion to sustain categorical exclusions
from patentable subject matter, finding this to be too crude a filter.
As a result, in the name of uniformity, the courts have extended
225
226
patent protection to living organisms, methods of doing business,
227
and software.
Nonetheless, courts retain discretion to reduce
uniformity cost on a per-patent basis through flexible subject matter
228
doctrines including the limitation on patenting “abstract ideas,” the
229
230
utility doctrine, novelty’s requirement of a prior “public” use, and
231
Application of other eligibility
the non-obviousness standard.
232
doctrines, such as the disclosure requirements of enablement, best
of equivalents).
225. See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308-09 (announcing that patentable subject
matter included human-made bacteria not naturally occurring in nature).
226. See State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368,
1375, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1596, 1599 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (rejecting the argument that
methods of doing business were not “processes” able to be patented).
227. See AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc’ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1356, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1447, 1450 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (observing that “since the manipulation of
numbers is a fundamental part of computer technology,” courts had to reassess
traditional patent law barring the patenting of mathematical algorithms in order to
determine what rights would be afforded to emerging software).
228. See O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1853) (giving birth to the
doctrine that abstract ideas are not patentable).
229. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (conferring protection upon “new and useful”
inventions). Although broadly construed, utility still places a meaningful limit on
patentability, particularly with respect to biotechnology and upstream research tools.
See, e.g., Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers, supra note 4, at 1644-45 (discussing utility with
respect to inventions in the life sciences, particularly the requirement of proof of
therapeutic effect for pharmaceutical patents).
230. See, e.g., Bernhardt, L.L.C. v. Collezione Europa USA, Inc., 386 F.3d 1371,
1381, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1901, 1909 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (explaining that the novelty
requirement of a public use takes into account “the nature of the activity that
occurred in public; the public access to and knowledge of the public use; and
whether there was any confidentiality obligation imposed upon persons who
observed the use”) (quotation omitted).
231. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (stating that an invention may not be patented when “the
differences between the [invention] and [a previously patented invention] are such
that . . . [they] would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a
person having ordinary skill in the art to which said [invention] pertains”).
232. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (requiring inventors to compose a detailed description of
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234

mode, and written description, as well as the triggers for statutory
235
bars, all supply tools for the courts to assess and reduce uniformity
cost. For example, non-obviousness and the disclosure doctrines vary
to a certain degree along technology-specific or industry-specific lines
because these are applied with reference to a “person having
236
ordinary skill in the art.”
When specifying eligibility through the PHOSITA device, the law
requires a court or a patent examiner to make a variety of judgments
concerning the level of skill in the art and the set of background
knowledge that the PHOSITA would be able to rely upon when
237
drafting or reading a patent. As Professors Allison and Tiller have
noted, “[w]hen one realizes that an ordinarily skilled practitioner
may range from an experienced mechanic or electrician to a person
with a Ph.D. and much experience in molecular biology or computer
science, the conclusion is inescapable that not all rules can be
238
applied exactly the same in every case.” The courts can and do vary
patent eligibility for different industries or technologies by the
amount of information and the kinds of technical skills that a
239
patentee can incorporate by reference.
Consider, for example, the role of the PHOSITA in three
doctrines: non-obviousness, enablement, and written description.
When contemplating whether the inventor’s solution to a particular
the invention to be patented, including information that would enable other
inventors to make and use the invention and to “set forth the best mode
contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention”).
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (denying patents for inventions that were patented,
described in a printed publication, or on sale within the United States for more than
one year prior to the date of the patent application).
236. See R. Polk Wagner, Comment, Exactly Backwards:
Exceptionalism and the
Federal Circuit, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 749, 751-52 (2004) (discussing the effects of
the PHOSITA standard on eligibility and scope, particularly the notion that the
“easier” the field, the more likely the patent will be rejected for obviousness and the
“harder” the field, the less likely the patent will be rejected for obviousness).
237. See id. at 751 (criticizing the widespread reliance on the PHOSITA standard,
with its variance amongst “easy” and “hard” fields, as having an indeterminate effect
on patents); Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers, supra note 4, at 1650 (acknowledging that
“[a] great deal of patent doctrine . . . rests upon the measurement of some legal
parameter against the skill and knowledge of the PHOSITA” and that “in
many . . . instances, the role of the PHOSITA is a judicial, rather than a statutory,
creation”).
238. John R. Allison & Emerson H. Tiller, The Business Method Patent Myth, 18
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 987, 1083 n.265 (2003).
239. See In re GPAC, Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1116, 1120
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (“The person of ordinary skill in the art is a hypothetical person who
is presumed to know the relevant prior art.” (quoting Custom Accessories, Inc. v.
Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1196, 1202 (Fed.
Cir. 1986))).
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problem would have been obvious at the time of invention, courts
and patent examiners must make judgments about the rate and
direction of innovation in a particular field and about the amount of
prior art and background knowledge that a PHOSITA could call
240
upon.
Similarly, courts and patent examiners must invoke the
PHOSITA to determine whether the written description in the patent
demonstrates that the inventor possessed the invention at the time of
filing, and whether the patent provides sufficient information to
enable a PHOSITA to practice the invention without undue
241
experimentation.
The patentee may incorporate by reference a
wide range of background theoretical and practical knowledge to
satisfy either inquiry, so long as the goals of the written description
242
and enablement requirements are met.
From the perspective of entitlement design, the legislative decision
to define patent eligibility largely through these standards, rather
than through rules reduces uniformity cost by rendering this
nominally uniform dimension of patent law more context-sensitive.
Indeed, the choice of standards over rules reflects a legislative
expectation that courts will use this interpretive discretion to reduce
uniformity cost by varying patentable subject matter in response to
the appropriability conditions surrounding a particular invention or
class of inventions as circumstances may indicate. This discretion has
been, and can be, used to tailor subject matter to manage and reduce
Type II uniformity costs by differentiating among types of processes
240. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Obvious To Whom? Evaluating Inventions from the
Perspective of PHOSITA, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 885 (2004) (arguing that the Federal
Circuit only partially incorporates the PHOSITA’s knowledge by excluding his or her
tacit knowledge); Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers, supra note 4, at 1593-94 (accusing the
Federal Circuit of applying a stringent nonobviousness standard to biotechnological
inventions, while applying a lenient nonobviousness standard to software cases);
Donald S. Chisum, Anticipation, Enablement and Obviousness: An Eternal Golden Braid,
15 AIPLA Q.J. 57, 58 (1987) (reiterating that an invention can be found obvious and
a patent not awarded to its inventor so long as it was obvious, if not entirely
anticipated, from a previously patented invention).
241. See, e.g., Northpoint Tech., Ltd. v. MDS Am., Inc., 413 F.3d 1301, 75
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (providing an example of a court divided
over whether the evidence at trial was sufficient to show a lack of enablement based
on level of the PHOSITA’s background knowledge).
242. See, e.g., Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., Inc., 358 F.3d 916, 921, 69
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1886, 1892 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (elucidating that while the written
description and enablement requirements “often [significantly] overlap . . . they are
nonetheless independent of each other” and “an invention may be described without
an enabling disclosure of how to make or use it” or “an invention may be enabled
even though is has not been described”); see also Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle &
Co., Inc., 375 F.3d 1303, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (denying
rehearing en banc accompanied by a range of dissenting and concurring opinions
discussing recent doctrinal developments with respect to enablement and written
description).
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in patent law (e.g. business methods) for which no appreciable
appropriability problem exists. The subject matter doctrines are less
well suited for addressing Type I uniformity costs, but these doctrines
still have an impact.
b.

Scope

The scope doctrines of patent law provide courts with an even
wider range of tools to reduce uniformity cost, particularly when
remedial options are included within the definition of an
entitlement’s scope. Commentators have recognized that scope
doctrines that rely upon the PHOSITA can be used by courts to
purposefully tailor patent protection along industry-specific or
243
technology-specific lines.
For example, an invention is defined by
the patent’s claims and these claims are to be interpreted as a matter
244
of law in the way a PHOSITA would read them.
Normally, the
words in a claim are to be given their ordinary meaning, unless the
245
In the latter case,
patentee has acted as her own lexicographer.
linguistic conventions within the field of invention could serve to
expand or narrow the scope of the “invention” to which the exclusive
246
rights apply.
Consequently, the scope of patent protection can vary depending
upon how liberally the courts and patent examiners understand the
amount of background knowledge that can be incorporated. Patent
scope also can vary along industry-specific or technology-specific lines
through application of the doctrine of equivalents, which extends the

243. See, e.g., Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers, supra note 4, at 1648-51 (analyzing
tailoring flexibility enabled by PHOSITA doctrines); Robert P. Merges & Richard R.
Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 916 (1990)
(“Our goal has been to show that scope doctrines can be used to approximate the
‘tailoring’ function proposed by economists who model optimal patent length, with
an eye toward retaining incentives for subsequent improvements.”).
244. See Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam, Ltd., 133 F.3d 1473, 1477, 45
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1429, 1432 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“It is the person of ordinary skill in
the field of the invention through whose eyes the claims are construed.”); see also
Craig Allen Nard, A Theory of Claim Interpretation, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 6 (2000)
(lauding the PHOSITA as “one of the cynosures of [the] patent system” because he
“has knowledge of the underlying assumptions present in his technological
community and is sensitive to facts on the ground”).
245. See Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1573, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (emphasizing that courts should look first to to
intrinsic evidence, namely the words used in the patent claim itself, because such
evidence is “the most significant source of the legally operative meaning of disputed
claim language”).
246. See, e.g., Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. BP Chems., Ltd., 78 F.3d 1575, 1578, 38
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1126, 1228 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“A technical term used in a patent
document is interpreted as having the meaning that it would be given by persons
experienced in the field of the invention.”).
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patentees’ rights to products or processes with elements deemed to
be the “equivalent” of elements in the claims defining the protected
247
To the extent that the PHOSITA is used to evaluate
invention.
equivalence, application of the doctrine is rendered context248
sensitive.
Finally, courts enjoy considerable discretion to fashion relief when
infringement has been proven, and this discretion should be applied
to reduce uniformity cost. Professors Burk and Lemley rightly point
out that there may be more situations than courts currently recognize
in which to withhold injunctive relief and the Supreme Court appears
249
poised to consider this view.
The point can be extended to
monetary relief as well. Industry-specific information plays an
essential role in the evidence supporting willfulness of the
infringement and the amount of any damage award, whether
calculated as a reasonable royalty or as lost profits.
2.

Copyright
Copyright law also uses standards along the subject matter and
scope dimensions to reduce uniformity cost.

247. See Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29
(1997) (recasting the doctrine of equivalents as applicable to the individual elements
of the patent claim and not to the invention in its entirety); see also Cotropia, “After
Arising”, supra note 6, at 192-201 (arguing that doctrine of equivalents should be
tailored for rapidly-developing, cumulative technology industries); Julie E. Cohen &
Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope And Innovation in the Software Industry, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1,
53-55 (2001) (arguing that the doctrine of equivalents should be tailored as applied
to software patents).
248. The courts have announced two different tests for equivalence. The first test
is the function-way-result test, which considers “the purpose for which an ingredient
is used in a patent, the qualities it has when combined with the other ingredients,
and the function which it is intended to perform.” Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde
Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 609 (1950). The second test is the reasonable
interchangeability test, which considers the extent to which the accused and claimed
elements are known to be interchangeable with each other. Hilton Davis Chem. Co.
v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc., 62 F.3d 1512, 1519, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641, 1647
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), rev’d on other grounds, 520 U.S. 17 (1997). The latter test
explicitly relies on the PHOSITA; it is less clear whether the former does as well.
249. See eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 733 (2005) (granting
certiorari to review MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1225 (Fed. Cir. 2005), which concerns the proper standard for granting
permanent injunctive relief against a patent infringer); Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers,
supra note 4, at 1665-68 (citing hold-ups, anticommons situations, and cases in which
appropriability conditions may favor a subsidized compulsory license as candidates
for withholding injunctive relief); see also Colleen Chien, Cheap Drugs at What Price to
Innovation:
Does the Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals Hurt Innovation?, 18
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 853, 857 (2003) (suggesting that appropriability conditions in
the pharmaceutical industry do not require property rule protection in order to
maintain incentives for pharmaceutical developers).
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Subject matter

With respect to subject matter, copyright law provides courts with
even greater doctrinal flexibility than does patent law. Principally,
these doctrines are the idea/expression dichotomy, the functionality
exception, and the merger doctrine. Copyright applies only to the
author’s original expression and not the abstract ideas embodied in
250
the copyrighted work.
As Learned Hand famously expounded,
courts seeking to draw the line between idea and expression must
251
choose a point along a continuum of abstraction.
Likewise, facts
are not copyrightable but an author’s expression in relating facts
252
usually will be sufficiently original to be copyrightable. Similar linedrawing difficulties arise and may be resolved differently depending
on subject matter. The merger doctrine holds that if there are
limited means to express ideas or facts, then the expression merges
with the uncopyrightable element and the whole of the author’s work
is either uncopyrightable or the copyright in the expression is
253
unenforceable. The functionality doctrine is related to merger and
holds that protection for expressive sculptural, pictorial, and graphic
works that are combined with functional goods is limited only to
250. The idea/expression dichotomy emanates from judicial interpretation and is
codified in 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)-(b), which explicitly confers protection upon “original
works . . . fixed in any tangible medium of expression” and denies protection to “any
idea . . . regardless of the form in which it is described.”
251. See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930)
(determining whether something is an “idea” or an “expression of an idea” is
generally accomplished by gauging the level of detail with which it was rendered).
252. See Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365, 1372 (5th Cir. 1981)
(refusing to extend copyright protection for research because it would amount to
copyright protection for facts).
253. Courts and scholars debate whether the merger doctrine applies to the
plaintiff’s claim to own a valid copyright or the claim that the defendant’s work is
infringing. Compare Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd., 9 F.3d 823, 838
(10th Cir. 1993) (“Under the merger doctrine, copyright protection is denied to
expression that is inseparable from or merged with the ideas, processes, or
discoveries underlying the expression.”) (emphasis added); Kern River Gas
Transmission Co. v. Coastal Corp., 899 F.2d 1458, 1460 (5th Cir. 1990) (applying the
merger doctrine to hold that survey maps that the defendant copied from the
plaintiff were not copyrightable instead of applying the doctrine to hold that the
maps infringed upon the copyright held by the plaintiff), with Schoolhouse, Inc. v.
Anderson, 275 F.3d 726, 730 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding that the defendant’s website
did not infringe upon the plaintiff’s magazine, which contained local school
information, because there was “only one way or only a few ways of expressing [that]
idea”); Computer Assoc. Int’l, Inc., v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 708 (2d Cir. 1992)
(denying relief for alleged copyright infringement where a computer program was
“the only and essential means of accomplishing a given task,” because in such an
instance the expression of the idea and the idea had merged) (citation omitted);
Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 705 (2d Cir. 1991) (stating that the Second
Circuit employs the merger doctrine to determine whether a plaintiff’s copyright has
been infringed upon rather than to determine whether a defendant’s copyright is
valid).
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expressive elements that are physically or conceptually separable
254
from the functional good.
b.

Scope

The scope of rights under copyright is determined in relation to a
number of context-sensitive standards. For example, whenever the
defendant’s work does not literally reproduce the plaintiff’s work, the
court must resolve whether the two works are “substantially similar”
255
from the “ordinary observer’s” perspective.
Both of these
judgments are context-sensitive and can be applied to reduce
uniformity cost. The most notable example of a court using this
256
flexibility is Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., which endorsed
the use of an abstraction-filtration-comparison method for
257
Even when
determining substantial similarity in software cases.
literal copying takes place, the copyright owner’s rights are limited by
258
flexible standards, such as fair use. This doctrine is flexible enough
259
to grant courts substantial tailoring discretion, as are less-frequently260
invoked infringement doctrines such as de minimis use, scènes à
254. See 17 U.S.C. § 113 (codifying the principle set out in Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S.
201 (1954) that an artist does not lose his or her copyright in an artistic work despite
the fact that the work is the basis for a functional good). In addition, the
uncopyrightable forms of expression identified in 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) exclude
protection for functional literary works, such as certain aspects of software. See, e.g.,
Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 815 (1st Cir. 1995) (finding that
a software menu structure that enabled multiple data entries with one “macro”
keystroke was an uncopyrightable “method of operation”), aff’d by an equally divided
Court, 516 U.S. 233 (1996).
255. See, e.g., Johnson v. Gordon, 409 F.3d 12, 18 (1st Cir. 2005) (observing that
copyright infringers seldom copy directly from an existing work and that “direct
proof” of copyright infringement is rarely available to the court); Incredible Techs.,
Inc. v. Virtual Techs., Inc., 400 F.3d 1007, 1011 (7th Cir. 2005) (warning that “the
concept of the ordinary observer must be viewed with caution . . . and [courts] must
heed the principle that, despite what the ordinary observer might see, the copyright
laws preclude appropriation of only those elements of the work that are protected by
the copyright”).
256. 982 F.2d at 693.
257. See id. at 706-12 (championing the abstraction-filtration-comparison method
as being rooted in familiar copyright doctrine while being considerate of the reality
that the software industry is constantly changing and may outpace legal
developments).
258. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (supplying an illustrative list and four factors for courts to
use when assessing fair use in copyright infringement cases).
259. See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 552
(1985) (asserting that “fair use analysis must always be tailored to the individual case”
in finding infringement due to unauthorized reproduction of exact portions of
Gerald Ford’s memoirs).
260. See, e.g., Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1193-94 (9th Cir. 2004)
(defining de minimis use as the appropriation of a copyright that would go
unrecognized by the average audience); Ringgold v. Black Entm’t Television, Inc.,
126 F.3d 70, 74-77 (2d Cir. 1997) (finding that the defendant’s repeated use of the
plaintiff’s poster in a television program was a de minimus use of the latter’s
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261

faire, and the useful article doctrine. Moreover, courts have license
262
to be flexible with the choice of a remedy.
CONCLUSION
The problem of uniformity cost has been recognized but
underanalyzed in the economic analysis of intellectual property law.
As the economic importance of information increases and as the
appropriability conditions in information-production sectors
continue to become more heterogeneous and complex, the law will
continue to come under increasing pressure to respond with greater
context-sensitivity. However, doing so will be difficult because
policymakers have limited capacity for aggregating and acting on the
necessary information about information-production.
Current law demonstrates use of three policy tools for reducing
uniformity cost. Real options, which place conditions on the
acquisition, enforcement, and maintenance of intellectual property
rights, reduce the social costs associated with low-value innovations
and those created under conditions offering appropriability
alternatives to intellectual property rights. Deployment of legal
standards rather than rules along the subject matter and scope
dimensions of patent and copyright enable more contextual decision
making to reduce uniformity costs. More directly, policymakers have
tailored rights in a number of cases. Recent trends in international
law reflect a move to constrain the tailoring discretion of member
States to the extent that tailoring would reduce the robustness of
some intellectual property rights. Notwithstanding this pressure,
policymakers still retain substantial tailoring discretion and more
analysis is needed to assess how and when this discretion should be
exercised.

copyright).
261. Scènes à faire are otherwise copyright expressive elements that “necessarily
result from the choice of a setting or situation.” Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784
F.2d 44, 50 (2d Cir. 1986).
Because they are unprotected, unauthorized
reproduction does not constitute infringement. See, e.g., Hoehling v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 979 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding representation of the
Hindenburg disaster as non-infringing because of the similarities necessitated by the
subject matter).
262. See 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) (2004) (stating that the court’s decision to grant
injunctive relief is discretionary); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569,
578 n.10 (1994) (urging lower courts to give due consideration to their discretion to
grant injunctive relief in parody cases).

